PROGRAM: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL NONRESIDENT PROGRAM


ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 10 hours

RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS: 3

PURPOSE: To provide a general knowledge of offensive and defensive tactics at the infantry battalion level.

SCOPE: Includes troop-leading procedures, selective portions of a plan of attack and defense, tactical control measures, principles of war, principles of security and reconnaissance, and communications.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: The learning objectives for this course are listed at the beginning of each chapter.
COURSE: TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS, NCF-75100

MATERIALS PROVIDED: Course text, Tactical Fundamentals

INFORMATION:

1. The "Estimated Student Effort" (10 hours) shown on the course title page indicates the time needed by the average student to complete the course. This includes time required to study text material and complete chapter exercise and examination.

2. Reserve retirement credits are earned at the rate of one credit for each 3 hours of estimated student effort as indicated on the course title page and are awarded upon successful completion of the course.

3. The material contained in this course was derived from doctrinal publications. You can achieve a broader understanding of the subjects presented by studying the following manuals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM 2-1</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 2-2</td>
<td>AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-1</td>
<td>COMMAND AND STAFF ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-3</td>
<td>MARINE INFANTRY BATTALION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN 100-5</td>
<td>OPERATIONS OF ARMY FORCES IN THE FIELD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN 5-199-200-15</td>
<td>WEAPON SIGHT, IR TELESCOPE YARD MOD 9903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TH 9-1425-484-10</td>
<td>OPERATOR'S MANUAL FOR DRAGON WEAPON GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCI 02.8</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION TO COMBAT INTELLIGENCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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PROGRAM OUTLINE

Upon completion of Tactical Fundamentals WCI-75108, your status and future study requirements are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Marine Force Organization</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Aviation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Support</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Functioning</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear and Chemical Support</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Operations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Operations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Doctrine</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Planning</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Exercise</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Communications</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The course list above is in numerical order. Due to low stock and an on-going revision process, you may receive courses out of sequence.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO TACTICS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 3 hours

SCOPE: Introduction to tactics to include principles of war; principles of reconnaissance; principles of security; and communications on a battalion level.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Identify and distinguish among the nine principles of war.
2. Identify the fundamentals of reconnaissance and the principles governing the employment of reconnaissance forces.
3. Identify the organization and concept of employment of the reconnaissance battalion and force reconnaissance company.
4. Describe the reconnaissance assets available in the Fleet Marine Force.
5. Identify the types of patrols and how to plan and coordinate their effective employment.
6. Identify the detection means available to a battalion commander and identify a few capabilities for each item of equipment.
7. Identify specific terminology associated with the relationship between security and reconnaissance.
8. State the fundamentals of security and the principles governing the employment of security forces.
9. Identify the different communication organizations and their functions within the infantry battalion.
10. Select and relate the communications required by the infantry battalion commander to exercise command and control of his organization.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Sections I, II, III, IV and V

COMPLETE: Chapter Exercise 1, 2, 3 and 4

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1. Introduction to Tactics</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section II. Principles of War</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Exercise 1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section III. Principles of Reconnaissance</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Exercise 2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section IV. Principles of Security</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Exercise 3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section V. Communications</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Exercise 4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2. Introduction to Offensive Tactics</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section II. Offensive Tactics</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Exercise 1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section III. Tactical Control Measures and Their Graphic Representation</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section IV. Plan of Attack</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section V. Summary</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Exercise 2</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3. Introduction to Defensive Tactics</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Exercise 1</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Exercise 2</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A. Tactical Evaluation of Terrain and Weather</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Exercise Solutions</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course Examination</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course Evaluation Questionnaire</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO TACTICS

"To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war."

Stonewall Jackson: Letter, 1863
Section I. INTRODUCTION

1101. GENERAL

No commander can afford to neglect any of the factors that may lead to the success of his unit in combat. For this reason, this chapter discusses the fundamental principles of tactics for the employment of the Marine infantry battalion in offensive and defensive land combat operations.

1102. MISSION OF INFANTRY

The mission of infantry in offensive combat is to locate, close with, and destroy or capture the enemy. The infantry accomplishes this mission by fire and maneuver. By fire, it inflicts losses on the enemy and neutralizes his combat power; by maneuver, it closes with the enemy and makes its fire more effective. The mission of infantry in defensive combat is, with the support of other arms, to repulse or destroy the enemy in front of its defensive position, to repel his assault by close combat if he reaches it, and to destroy or eject him by counterattack if he succeeds in penetrating the battle area.
Section II. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1201. GENERAL

a. "War is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success."

Major General H. W. Halleck, USA:
Elements of Military Art and Success, 1846

b. You may wonder why you, as professional military men with several years of service experience, are being subjected to another session of study on the principles of war. It has been proven throughout the history of warfare that these principles are the foundation upon which victory in combat is built. For this reason, we will review them in some detail.

1202. BACKGROUND

a. Just what are these "principles of war" and where did they come from? What is there about them that causes us to give them so much attention, to regard them as the foundation of victory? We can't be entirely sure where they came from. Certainly, since the beginning of armed conflict, military leaders (and civilians, too) have attempted to capitalize on past experience and pass this knowledge on in some form—principles, maxims, fundamentals, rules. Today, we have a mass of material on the subject, ranging from earliest recorded history through the latest issues of our professional publications. The sheer volume of material can be likened to the mountain of literature written about the Civil War. As you know, within a few years after the war, practically every general officer, most of the field grade officers, and countless others, down to and including privates, had written their memoirs and interpretations of the war as they saw it. Since then, and particularly in the last few years, hundreds of books have appeared, written by scholars who attempt to reinterpret the original evaluations. As interesting as these may be, the terrific mass of material tends to confuse the student. The same confusion is created by the treatises on principles of war. Through the years, principles of war have varied greatly in number as well as in content. One of the oldest listings was made by the Chinese General Sun Tzu about 500 B.C., who listed 13. Through the years, the numerical trend was upward, until it reached an all-time high with Napoleon's 115 maxims. Clausewitz was a bit less verbose; he set forth seven general fundamentals; Nelson cites 10 and, as we shall see, in recent years the norm has been around 8 to 12. The Marine Corps currently subscribes to nine. These nine were, as nearly as we can determine, first stated in their present form by the noted soldier and military scholar Major General J. P. C. Fuller of the British Army.
b. Regardless of how many principles we decide to use, or just which listing we favor, we are on pretty firm ground in attempting to adopt one commonly accepted philosophy governing strategy and tactics and a grouping of maxims, precepts, or considerations. Military history proves that the application of certain principles has most often led to success in battle and, conversely, leaders who ignored certain fundamentals were usually defeated. We can point to exceptions, of course, where generals have won battles in spite of transgressing or ignoring principles and conversely where generals have diligently observed them and yet suffered defeat. These exceptions do more than point out the fact that any attempt to apply a formula to a tactical situation, or any attempt to adhere rigidly to a given set of principles may well lead to disaster. It is by no means enough to know the principles of war; one must know how to apply each of them, how much weight to assign to each in a particular situation, and how to resolve conflicts between them. In a final analysis, these "principles," or "fundamental truths" as FM 100-5 calls them, or "basic military rules or guides" as they are described at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, are merely a collection of items of plain common sense and they must be understood in that light. They are not a guarantee of success, but failure to know, understand, and apply them involves a high degree of risk. They must be considered in every case and modified as the situation dictates. At this point, and with the application of the principles, the practitioner of war becomes more of an artist than a scientist. Now, take a look at the nine principles of war and examine each in detail.

1203. THE NINE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

It was stated earlier that the principles of war are considered to be the foundation upon which victory is built. Let us continue to use this analogy. As the cornerstone in our foundation, let's use the principle which has long been considered by most military leaders and writers to be the master or controlling principle—the principle of the objective.

a. Principle of the Objective. Every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The ultimate military objective of war is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight. The objective of each operation must contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objective. Each intermediate objective must be such that its attainment will most directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. The selection of an objective is based upon consideration of the means available, the enemy, and the area of operations. Every commander must understand and clearly define his objective and consider each contemplated action in light thereof. At our level, we often tend to think of objectives in terms of key terrain. We must be careful to recognize that geographical or terrain objectives are merely means to an end. Additionally, the use of nuclear weapons in no way alters the principle of the objective, although the desired destruction may be carried out a bit more quickly. After considering the principle of the objective, we...
find that most authorities do not assign any precedence or priority to the other principles. It is evident that the principles complement each other—some more than others—and, in some cases, they may even conflict. Therefore, when completing our foundation, there is no set sequence in which these building blocks must be installed; however, most of us think of offensive immediately after objective.

b. Principle of the Offensive. Offensive action is necessary to achieve decisive results and maintain freedom of action. It permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose his will upon the enemy, to set the pace and determine the course of battle, to exploit enemy weaknesses and rapidly changing situations, and to meet unexpected developments. Defensive action may be forced on the commander, but it should be deliberately adopted only as a temporary expedient while awaiting an opportunity for offensive action or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought. Even during the defense, the commander seeks every opportunity to seize the initiative and achieve decisive results by offensive action. Regardless of whether we are on the offensive or on the defensive, simplicity must be the keynote of each operation. One must realize the truth of the old maxim attributed to von Moltke that "If an order can be misunderstood, it will be." Therefore, the commander must observe the principle of simplicity.

c. Principle of Simplicity. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. If all factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferred. We know that combat breeds confusion and, therefore, orders and plans must be as concise and yet as flexible as possible. It may be seen at this point that since several of these principles are so closely related, some definite decisions must be made to ensure optimum use of each. These decisions can be made effectively only when we have unity of command.

d. Principle of Unity of Command. The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority. It's an old adage that whenever two people get together, one of them must take charge. Our Marine Corps air-ground team is built around this principle of unity of command. With one individual in indisputable control, he must have a thorough understanding of the principles of mass and economy of force to be a successful commander. He must be able to determine the proper balance of combat power needed at a particular time and place.
e. Principle of Mass. Superior combat power must be concentrated at the critical time and place for a decisive purpose. Superiority results from the proper combination of the elements of combat power. Proper application of the principle of mass, in conjunction with the other principles of war, may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive combat superiority. We must be careful not to think of mass as numbers of troops only. Actually, in applying the principle of mass we mean superior combat power which includes such elements as weapons, morale, tactical skill, and logistic support.

f. Principle of Economy of Force. Skillful and prudent use of combat power enables the commander to accomplish the mission with minimum expenditure of resources. This principle is the corollary of the principle of mass. It does not imply husbanding but rather the measured allocation of available combat power to the primary task as well as secondary tasks such as limited attacks, the defense, deception, or even retrograde actions in order to ensure sufficient combat power at the point of decision.

1. The most easily understood example is that of the main and supporting attack. The supporting attack holds the enemy in place, deceives him, and occupies his attention with a portion of the force while a main attack, utilizing the preponderance of combat power, smashes him at his weakest point.

2. To obtain this proper balance of combat power at the proper time and in the proper places, one must understand the principle of maneuver. Through the years, this principle has gone under different names, such as movement or flexibility—it is now called maneuver.

3. Principle of Maneuver. Maneuver is an essential ingredient of combat power and contributes materially in exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability. The object of maneuver is to dispose forces in such a manner as to place the enemy at a disadvantage and thus achieve results which would otherwise be more costly in men and material. Successful maneuver requires flexibility in organization, administrative support, and command and control.

1. This is simply the movement of combat power to a more advantageous position with respect to the enemy. It is the method by which we achieve combat superiority and is not limited to troops alone. Supporting fires and logistic support may also be maneuvered. The term implies a continuous movement designed to keep the enemy off balance.

2. Whether we term it "maneuver," "movement," or "flexibility," this principle obviously takes on added meaning in this age of the nuclear weapon and its attendant unit separation concept and may be our best defense against defeat in detail. Our attention to means, such as the helicopter, of accomplishing rapid movement over terrain previously considered impassable shows that we recognize the validity of this principle.
h. Principle of Surprise. The principles of mass and economy of force through maneuver are best achieved when we have the element of surprise. Regardless of whether we participate in a nuclear war or some less drastic form of action, one principle which can be achieved with either an H-bomb delivered by an undetected plane or missile, or a knife in the back wielded by a guerrilla is that of surprise. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. Surprise results from striking an enemy at a time, place, and in a manner for which he is not prepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken completely unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to effectively react. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, deception, application of unexpected combat power, effective intelligence and counterintelligence including communication and electronic security, and variations in tactics and methods of operation. In the past, the greatest error applicable to the principle of surprise has been failure to combine it with the principle of mass. While considering ways to prevent the enemy from surprising us and to help us achieve an element of surprise over him, we must think of security.

i. Principle of Security. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power. Security is achieved by measures taken to prevent surprise, preserve freedom of action, and deny the enemy information on friendly forces. Since risk is inherent in war, application of the principle of security does not imply undue caution and the avoidance of calculated risks. Security frequently is enhanced by bold seizure and retention of the initiative which denies the enemy the opportunity to interfere. Security is both active and passive. By active security we protect ourselves from the enemy by obtaining information about him—by passive security we deny him information about us. But it is more than information since it includes employing all methods and means at our disposal, from radar and listening posts to camouflage and dispersion. When operating under the threat of nuclear warfare, we will find that the fluid situation, wider frontages, and gaps between units offer greater opportunity for enemy infiltration both from the ground and air.

1204. SUMMARY

These, then, are the nine principles of war adhered to throughout the Marine Corps. They are useful tools but are only as effective as the person using them. None of the nine principles will stand alone—they support each other. In the final analysis, these principles are only guides. It is up to the commander to determine when they will be applied, which ones to apply, and the manner in which their application will have the most favorable influence on the successful outcome of the battle.
CHAPTER 1: Circle the best answer to each test item 1 through 8. Check your answers with the solutions located at the end of the text.

1. A battalion commander who positions his forces in such a manner as to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage is exercising the principle of ________.
   a. surprise  
   b. mass  
   c. maneuver  
   d. economy of force

2. During the Korean conflict, General MacArthur made the momentous decision to hold at Pusan and conduct an amphibious landing at Inchon. Decisionmaking requires a singleness of authority to produce maximum effort toward a common goal. Such singleness of authority is reflective in the principle of ________.
   a. simplicity  
   b. unity of command  
   c. offense  
   d. maneuver

3. The principle of war that is recognized as being the master or controlling principle is the principle of ________.
   a. mass  
   b. surprise  
   c. offense  
   d. objective

4. A commander employing the principle of mass must also employ the corollary principle of ________.
   a. maneuver  
   b. economy of force  
   c. simplicity  
   d. surprise

5. Defensive action may be forced upon the commander, but it should only be temporary while awaiting an opportunity to employ the principle of ________.
   a. offense  
   b. maneuver  
   c. mass  
   d. surprise

6. The principles of economy of force ________.
   a. protects forces from the enemy by obtaining information about him  
   b. requires flexibility in administrative support and command and control  
   c. ensures that sufficient combat power is applied at the point of decision  
   d. requires speed, deception, and the application of unexpected combat power

7. The principle of simplicity is best exemplified by ________.
   a. a commander who issues clear and concise orders to minimize confusion  
   b. a coordinated effort of all forces toward a common objective  
   c. the proper determination of an appropriate balance of combat power  
   d. the accomplishment of the mission with a minimum expenditure of resources

8. Enemy application of the principle of surprise may be overcome by the proper application of ________.
   a. unity of command  
   b. mass  
   c. simplicity  
   d. security

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Section III. PRINCIPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE

1301. GENERAL

"Time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted."

British Army Service Regulations, 1912

a. The purpose of this section is to provide a general knowledge of the basic aspects of reconnaissance, primarily from the viewpoint of the infantry battalion commander and his staff.

b. All unit commanders face specific reconnaissance and security responsibilities. In practice, it is difficult to draw a line and say that reconnaissance activities are categorized on one side and security activities on the other, or where reconnaissance ends and security begins. Effective reconnaissance goes a long way toward ensuring security; conversely, forces engaged in security activities collect a great deal of enemy information, thereby actually performing a reconnaissance function.

c. To ensure that we are thinking on the same frequency, let's discuss a basic list of definitions and terms as they are associated with reconnaissance and security.

1302. TERMINOLOGY

a. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance, then, is a mission undertaken to gather information about the enemy or a geographical area. This is normally accomplished by a patrol, aircraft, or a unit with a mission involving collection of specific information.

b. Surveillance. Surveillance is the systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes. Unlike reconnaissance, which implies movement, surveillance implies continuous observation from a stationary position, except in aerial surveillance. It is normally accomplished by observation posts and listening posts.

c. Counterreconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance includes all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place. The term embodies all those active and passive measures utilized to deny observation to the enemy. An example of passive counterreconnaissance would be the effective use of camouflage and smoke. An example of active counterreconnaissance would be the establishment of ambushes designed to intercept and destroy enemy reconnaissance patrols.
d. Reconnaissance in Force. An operation conducted by a considerable force to discover and test the enemy's dispositions and strengths, or to develop other intelligence, reconnaissance in force implies a willingness (in fact a very deliberate plan) to engage the enemy in close combat in order to acquire specific information. In the Army, reconnaissance in force is performed by mounted reconnaissance units or armored cavalry units of company size or larger. In the Marine Corps, the reconnaissance in force function is performed by infantry units, either mounted or dismounted, and reinforced as required for the mission and supported by Marine aircraft. Reconnaissance in force operations are used to locate the enemy, destroy if possible, or collect information about him.

e. Reconnaissance by Fire. A method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. This is a technique employed to develop a tactical situation when time doesn't allow complete coverage of an area or when reconnaissance by stealth is not a factor. In addition to infantry units being well adapted to conduct reconnaissance by fire, this function is obviously one which may be also conducted by tanks, aircraft, artillery, or a combination of these forces, including the infantry.

These are some of the basic terms that will be discussed throughout this and the following section on security. All reconnaissance operations vary in accordance with the situation and conditions in the area in which they are conducted, and with the size, type, composition, and assigned missions of the employed units. However, all such operations are guided by the following fundamentals.

1303. FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE

a. Orient on the Location and Movement of the Intelligence Objective. In order to stay with the enemy, reconnaissance elements must orient their operations on the enemy, not his parent unit. The only way to remain oriented on the enemy is to move with him if he moves; consequently, free maneuver is required on the part of reconnaissance elements. In this respect, it is preferable that the patrol have superior mobility to that of the enemy, particularly if a single patrol is employed to determine the actual size or area occupied by an enemy force. In practice, however, it is seldom that one patrol would be used to locate both flanks—or even an extensive portion of an enemy's front. Rather, several probes or combat patrols would probably be employed to determine the enemy dispositions.
b. Report All Information Accurately and Promptly. The individual members of a reconnaissance patrol do not possess the background to determine whether a piece of information is significant or not. However, the battalion commander and his S-2 will be able to judge the relative importance of information. Therefore, it is essential that all information be passed immediately to the S-2, who can best utilize it. As a matter of standing operating procedure (SOP), patrols report such things as progress, initial contact, and items of obvious importance. However, it will take a debriefing to dig out the less obvious information—that information the patrol has forgotten to relate, that which is reluctantly given for some reason, a negative information which, perhaps at times, can be more important than positive information. Naturally, all of this information must be passed through channels to the next higher echelons.

c. Avoid Decisive Engagement. We are interested in acquiring as much information as possible without tipping off the enemy to our interest. However, patrols are provided with the means to collect information or perform screening missions by close combat, if necessary; in fact, the so-called "reconnaissance in force" is actually a raid or limited objective attack to test the enemy's dispositions and strength. Normally reconnaissance patrols resort to combat only if it is absolutely necessary to accomplish the assigned mission, or to prevent destruction or capture. In general, it is preferable to conduct a reconnaissance by stealth and surveillance without the enemy being aware.

d. Maintain Enemy Contact. "Physical contact" is not intended, but rather reconnaissance-type contact. It is essential that patrols, whether mounted or afoot, strive to gain contact as rapidly as possible and maintain it continuously. The purpose of such activity is obvious: the only way to find out anything about the enemy is to locate him early and stay with him. In this respect, the reconnaissance activity of the battalion is usually much heavier prior to initial contact than after contact has been made. Normally, once an engagement has ensued at battalion level, the information collection function of reconnaissance patrols is executed primarily by the engaged elements of the battalion, and active reconnaissance patrolling may cease altogether. Remember, contact in this sense means reconnaissance-type contact—to locate or observe—not physical contact.

e. Develop the Situation. This is our final principle. Once contact is made, the reconnaissance force immediately takes action to determine the enemy's strength, composition, dispositions, and, perhaps, intentions with special effort made to determine the flanks of his position. At this point, a decision to engage, avoid, or bypass is normally made.

1304. MAJOR GROUND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

There are two major ground units in the Fleet Marine Force specifically designed for conducting ground reconnaissance—The force reconnaissance company and the division reconnaissance battalion.
a. Force Reconnaissance Company. The primary mission of the force reconnaissance company is to conduct preassault and deep postassault reconnaissance in support of a landing force.

(1) In course 7501, Fleet Marine Force Organization, you learned that this company is under the control of the Fleet Marine Force. The company is composed of a company headquarters, a supply and service platoon, and six reconnaissance platoons. These six platoons break down into three four-man reconnaissance teams totaling 18 individual reconnaissance teams available for use by the LF commander for executing specific missions. The 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies, FMFPAC, are currently in a cadre status. 2d Reconnaissance Company, FMFLANT, is directly under FMFLANT and is ASSOC to 2d FSSG. One platoon within the 1st and 3d Division Reconnaissance Battalion is equipped and trained to carry out the mission of preassault and deep postassault reconnaissance. (See figure 1.)

Figure 1. Force Reconnaissance Company.
All members of the Force reconnaissance platoons are trained in surface swimming, inflatable rubber boat handling techniques, and parachute entry into an objective area. All are trained in underwater winning (XUBA) and entry techniques. These teams are not equipped, trained, or intended to engage in decisive or sustained close combat. Instead, rapid maneuver and reporting are the methods they use to accomplish assigned reconnaissance tasks. The teams collect raw information for the CLF but are not capable of processing any of this information into intelligence—this is accomplished by the LF staff. The force reconnaissance company also possesses the capability of providing terminal guidance for initial assault helicopter waves prior to the arrival of landing zone control teams. These missions involve visual or electronic navigational aid to the assault helicopters. However, teams do not have capability of providing landing zone traffic control or performing the functions of helicopter support teams.

The concept of employment for the company normally envisions each team acting independently; consequently, 18 separate fact-finding patrols or assignments may be dispatched—each reporting directly back to the CLF. Patrols are briefed, introduced into their operating area, and recovered separately. The six platoon commanders, therefore, really function in a supervisory capacity and are normally employed as patrol leaders only when two or more teams are task organized together with support for conducting a specific mission. The grouping of three teams into a platoon is consequently more of an administrative technique than a tactical necessity. The company has no significant offensive capability and is not normally assigned missions, tactical objectives, or a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) in the normal meanings of these. The company performs its mission by providing small teams to collect information for the CLF and not as a direct service to the division commander or his regiments and battalions.

b. Division Reconnaissance Battalion. Our second specifically trained ground reconnaissance unit in the Fleet Marine Force is the Marine division reconnaissance battalion. Its primary mission is to provide distant ground reconnaissance and observation in support of the division and its subordinate elements. This refers, of course, to the infantry regiments and battalions.

(1) The reconnaissance battalion, organic to the Marine division, is composed of a headquarters and service company and four reconnaissance companies. Each company breaks down into three reconnaissance platoons with each platoon having two squads with two four-man teams each. The fourth reconnaissance company of each of the reconnaissance battalions is presently in a cadre status and is organizationally located directly under the appropriate Fleet Marine Force Headquarters. (See figure 2.) (NOTE: Refer to 7058 Intelligence, for the current organization of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Reconnaissance Battalions.)
The Marines of the reconnaissance companies are trained in surface swimming and inflatable rubber-boat handling techniques. Some are trained in underwater (SCUBA) entry techniques and some are trained in parachute entry. The battalion is not equipped, trained, or normally expected to become decisively engaged with the enemy but is expected to accomplish assigned reconnaissance tasks through stealth, rapid maneuver, and rapid reporting. It is not capable of true counterreconnaissance missions and is heavily dependent upon the use of helicopters and organic light vehicles to provide sufficient mobility. The battalion has the capability, as does the Force reconnaissance company, of checking and verifying selected landing sites and providing initial terminal guidance for assault helicopter waves through visual, electronic, or pyrotechnic means but does not possess landing zone control or helicopter support team capabilities.
For maximum effectiveness, the reconnaissance battalion is employed as a unit under division control, whereby the battalion commander receives mission-type orders from the division commander and reports directly to him. This provides for maximum efficiency and exploits the organic mobility and extensive communications of the battalion. In addition, it makes optimum use of the battalion staff in the detailed planning required in reconnaissance and utilizes the battalion’s logistical and maintenance assets to its best advantage. Normally, the basic element operating beyond friendly lines is the four-man scout team. At times, entire platoons may be utilized to implement a platoon patrol base concept. However, the battalion’s basic organization is well adapted to provide detachments in support of subordinate division units, especially the infantry regiments and battalions. The organization of the battalion into four reconnaissance companies allows one to be placed in support of each infantry regiment/ART, while a fourth company remains to provide required reconnaissance support for the division under control of the division commander. The three platoons with each company permit task organizing of reconnaissance companies/platoons in support of infantry regiments/battalions to be ideal when the mission or area of operations presents a reconnaissance requirement beyond the organic capabilities of the infantry unit specifically, independent deployment, perhaps within MAUs or MACs.

Now that you are familiar with these two units, what determines whether a mission is assigned to the force reconnaissance company or to the division reconnaissance battalion?

Relationship Between Reconnaissance Units. The answer to the question generally depends upon two considerations: the time of the mission execution relative to D-day and the location of the mission execution relative to the forward limit of the operational area assigned to the commander of the LF ground component.

(1) Reconnaissance missions requiring maneuver ashore and conducted prior to D-day are normally assigned to the force reconnaissance company or its elements. However, this does not preclude landing elements of the reconnaissance battalion prior to H-hour (on D-day) to conduct reconnaissance, establish observation posts (OPs), or provide terminal guidance for helicopterborne elements of the LF. Force reconnaissance company units will normally conduct deep reconnaissance missions beyond the force beachhead line (FBHL) after D-day.

(2) Once ashore, when an operational area is established for the ground component of the LF, the reconnaissance battalion (or elements thereof) in support of the ground component of the LF) will handle all distant reconnaissance missions within this operational area or on its immediate fringes. These distant reconnaissance missions will normally be performed in the area between the no-fire line (NFL) and the force beachhead line (FBHL). The reconnaissance battalion does not normally operate outside the artillery fan of fire.
1305. RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE FMF

a. General. An infantry battalion commander will seldom have reconnaissance units attached to or in direct support of his unit except when he is operating independently. Normally, however, the infantry battalion commander will be able to request the information provided by these reconnaissance units through normal command channels.

b. Aviation Units. The WFP (Marine photographic reconnaissance squadron) with high-performance jet aircraft is capable of performing aerial multisensor imagery reconnaissance, and the WMF (Marine electronic warfare squadron), also with jet aircraft, is capable of performing airborne electronic reconnaissance. The WMO (Marine observation squadron), capable of transporting air observers for purposes of aerial visual reconnaissance, is also available on request. Finally, the WMA/WPTA (attack and fighter attack squadrons) and the assault helicopter squadrons are capable of conducting aerial reconnaissance, transporting troop elements for reconnaissance purposes, or taking aloft ground commanders to conduct their own personal aerial reconnaissance.

c. Division Unit. The Marine division has only one unit specifically trained for ground reconnaissance - the reconnaissance battalion; but other units, such as artillery, tanks, AAVs, and engineers, may assist the infantry in areas of reconnaissance by fire, reconnaissance by fire, and screening. Additionally, there is another organic reconnaissance capability - the Naval aerial observer (NAD). There are nine artillery Naval aerial observers available within the operations platoon of the artillery regiment's headquarters battery. The 10 NADs previously organic to the Marine division G-2 section are now organic to the visual air reconnaissance squadron (VMAO) of the Marine aircraft wing. The NADs in the VMAO are, however, still under the cognizance of the division G-2 for operations; he still assigns them areas to be covered in order to ensure the complete integration of the overall reconnaissance and surveillance effort. (See figure 3.) These NADs are ground officers trained in all aspects of aerial observation techniques and possessing the capability of taking aerial photos with hand-held cameras. Normally, and perhaps most desirably, all NADs within the division are "pooled" for operational purposes under the control of the G-2 section. A battalion commander, in planning for the future use of NADs, makes his request through the normal G-2 channels. If approved, the NAD, along with the necessary aircraft will be provided. In a "hot" operational situation, a commander may request an NAD via the division air observation (DAO) net or via the tactical air request (TAR) net. If all this fails, and the battalion enjoys the naval gunfire support of a direct support ship, the commander may be able to acquire air observation support by the two NADs assigned to the ship; however, these NADs are not best suited for this mission primarily due to aircraft limitations and availability.
Aerial Observers

![Diagram of Aerial Observers]

4. Infantry Battalion. Although the infantry battalion commander receives assistance from outside agencies (aircraft wing and other division elements), his primary means for collecting information about the enemy is through his three rifle companies, augmented by the surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon of the Infantry Battalion H & S Company. All of the outside agencies can assist him and add depth to his reconnaissance effort, but they can never assume the entire burden of reconnaissance for the infantry battalion. The major reconnaissance means for an infantry battalion must lie in the patrolling efforts of the three rifle companies.

1306. COMMANDER'S PATROL PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

Most reconnaissance at the battalion level is conducted through patrolling and it has already been stated that the primary means for collecting enemy information at that level lies in the patrolling efforts of the rifle companies. Therefore, let us focus on the commander's overall responsibilities and planning considerations regarding the patrolling effort at the infantry battalion level.

4. Patrol Types and Purposes. For classification purposes, patrols are identified by the type of mission performed—reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols.

(1) Reconnaissance patrols collect or confirm information previously received. They will normally be organized into a reconnaissance element and a security element. Missions assigned may vary from a point reconnaissance (which refers to a specific location, position, or activity) to an area reconnaissance (which refers to patrols conducted within an area defined by boundaries and within which maximum freedom of action is allowed.)
(2) Combat patrols provide security, establish and maintain contact, deny enemy access, and harass, capture, and destroy the enemy. A combat patrol is normally composed of an assault element, a security element, and a support element. The names of various combat patrols are indicative of the different missions assigned; consequently, there are raid patrols to capture and destroy; ambush patrols to surprise and ambush enemy units; contact patrols to maintain physical/visual contact with friendly or enemy forces; security patrols to screen economy of force patrols which establish roadblocks, seize key terrain, cover withdrawals, and block enemy interference. Although reconnaissance is not the primary function of combat patrols, such patrols provide a major source of information to complement specific reconnaissance patrols.

b. Battalion Patrol Plan. At the infantry battalion level, a single patrol plan is periodically prepared and produced—normally every 24 hours. This patrol plan embodies all aspects of that battalion's entire patrolling effort throughout its entire area of operations for that specific period of time. It is the responsibility of the S-3 to publish the patrol plan based on recommendations of the S-2, submissions from the company commanders, and guidance from the commander. The plan (complete with overlays) indicates who will conduct the patrols, where they will be employed, what their tasks are, and what information is required of them.

c. Commander's Patrolling Responsibilities. We know that the commander is responsible for his unit's entire patrolling effort. Although this is true, we also know that he can't possibly keep track of every detail in this extensive area. Therefore, he delegates to his staff officers and subordinate commanders the authority to carry out certain patrolling functions and tasks, thereby assisting him to meet his patrolling responsibilities.

(1) First, the commander is responsible for the formulation of patrol missions. In this regard, the S-2 and S-3 work together; however, the S-2 normally plans and recommends missions for reconnaissance patrols; the S-3 normally plans and recommends missions for combat patrols. These missions will be based upon the commander's essential elements of information (EEl's) and upon his immediate tactical situation.

(2) Patrol orders are certainly a responsibility of the commander; however, the commander couldn't possibly issue each one personally. Usually, they will be issued by the staff officer or subordinate commander actually dispatching the patrol. The order follows the standard five-paragraph order format and must contain the details for contingencies that may be encountered. Although several missions may be assigned, one must stand out as the dominant and primary mission. Various battalion staff officers may be required to brief patrols regarding their specific functional areas (i.e., civil affairs, intelligence, and fire support).
(3) Coordination of the patrolling effort is a major responsibility and it must be complete and continuous particularly for patrols of extended duration. The battalion must coordinate the entire effort with higher and all adjacent units and obviously with the various patrols themselves. The patrol leader must coordinate with units providing support for his patrol and units he may come in contact within the operational area of his patrol. The S-3 must arrange the necessary supporting fires to effectively meet all contingencies; the S-2 and S-3 must arrange for specially trained personnel to accompany the patrol—e.g., guides, interpreters, demolitionists, and terminal guidance personnel—and the supply officer may also be required to provide special equipment.

(4) Control or influence over the patrolling effort is maintained by the commander through the assignment of various control measures usually designated by the dispatching commander or cognizant staff officer. All of these control measures must be made known to everyone involved with the patrolling effort and will appear on the battalion's patrol plan.

(a) Control measures such as time of departure and time of return must be assigned each patrol. These can be staggered to prevent confusion or congestion in the area, reduce the possibility of fire-fight contacts between patrols, and enable a patrol to more effectively cover an extended area over a longer period of time. Times of return ensure receipt of any acquired information in time for it to be useful.

(b) Patrol routes must be designated to control movement and ensure mission accomplishment. The exact route will seldom be specified, allowing for some patrol leader or dispatching commander initiative, except, perhaps, for a detailed route reconnaissance. However, checkpoints may be specified as a general route and patrols will report their positions relative to those locations. Similarly, if a patrol base concept is being utilized, the locations and rotation system of the patrol bases should be specified.

(c) Reporting procedures also must be specified. These procedures will indicate what reports will be made, when, by what means, and techniques to be employed. Normally, radio will be utilized to the maximum. By using secure transmission radio equipment and low-level code/crypto systems, transmission time is reduced, readability and clarity are increased, and compromise of the transmission and the patrol mission is avoided. Battalion-directed patrols are debriefed by the appropriate staff officer or subordinate commander. One effective debriefing method requires the patrol leader to give a narrative account of the patrol from departure to return. Each patrol member then contributes any additional information he has. Then, the debriefer asks the patrol leader questions to secure desired information not otherwise gained, such as negative information. All patrol members should always be offered the opportunity to add any information relating to the execution of the patrol. The patrol report form (STANAG 2003, Ed. 3), as found in FMFM 2-1, should be used whenever possible.
1307. SUMMARY

Information on the enemy, where he is going, where he has been, and what he is doing is extremely vital to battlefield success. We can obtain this vital information only through a well- coordinated reconnaissance program.
CHAPTER 1 EXERCISE 2: Circle the best answer to questions 1 through 8. Solutions are located at the end of the text.

1. In the Marine Corps, reconnaissance in force is a function of___________________.
   a. the division reconnaissance battalion
   b. combat support units
   c. the force reconnaissance company
   d. infantry units

2. The division reconnaissance battalion___________________.
   a. is employed under regimental control for maximum effectiveness
   b. provides two of its companies for reconnaissance support to the division
   c. is organized to support independent infantry battalion operations
   d. commander reports directly to the regimental commander which he supports

3. In amphibious operations, assignments not normally characteristic of force reconnaissance company employment are___________________.
   a. terminal guidance tasks requiring parachute entry
   b. distant reconnaissance patrols of company size
   c. reconnaissance missions significantly outside of the area covered by the division
   d. reconnaissance mission conducted prior to D-day

4. A limited objective operation to determine and test the enemy's disposition and strength is characteristic of___________________.
   a. reconnaissance by fire
   b. reconnaissance in force
   c. surveillance
   d. counterreconnaissance

5. Preparation and publication of the battalion patrol plan is the staff responsibility of
  ___________________.
   a. XO
   b. FSC
   c. S-2
   d. S-3

6. The two basic types of patrols used in the total patrolling effort are___________________.
   a. combat and ambush
   b. reconnaissance and contact
   c. reconnaissance and economy of force
   d. combat and reconnaissance

7. The battalion patrol plan (complete with overlays) will normally indicate all of the following about the patrols except___________________.
   a. the name of the patrol leader
   b. who will conduct the patrols
   c. where the patrols will be employed
   d. what the patrols' tasks are

8. In coordinating the battalion patrolling effort, the___________________.
   a. patrol leader must provide special equipment
   b. regiment must coordinate with adjacent units
   c. supply officer may provide the demolitionists
   d. S-3 must arrange the necessary supporting fires
Section IV. PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY

1401. GENERAL

Chesty Puller is alleged to have said, "The road to hell is paved with the bleached bones of second lieutenants who forgot their local security."

a. We learned from the principles of war that commanders achieve security by taking the measures necessary to prevent surprise and to deny the enemy information about friendly forces.

b. This section will be concerned primarily with gaining an insight into the means and techniques employed by the infantry battalion commander to attain this security.

1402. DEFINITION AND FUNDAMENTALS

a. Security is defined as those measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observations, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. It may also be defined as a condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures which ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. Security is achieved by effective application of five basic fundamentals.

1. Orient on the Location or Movement of the Force Being Secured. Security forces are concerned primarily with nullifying the enemy's collection effort. The amount of movement of the main force will determine just how mobile or how stationary our security force should be.

2. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance. All security forces must perform continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. This reconnaissance provides the security force commander with information on enemy forces in his area of responsibility and thereby enables him to properly position the security force in relation to the force being protected and the direction of the enemy threat. Reconnaissance also keeps the main body commander informed of enemy locations and movement, thus providing security from surprise.

3. Provide Timely and Accurate Warning. The security force must provide its unit commander early warning of the location and movement of enemy forces. Only by timely warning and accurate information can the commander choose the forces, time, and place to engage the enemy, and maneuver his forces to gain tactical surprise and advantage. Security elements which have a mission of observation or detection, such as a series of OPs along an exposed flank, are not expected to engage enemy patrols in a fire fight; however, even the lightest of elements can bring observed supporting arms fire to bear on an enemy patrol.
(4) Provide Space for Maneuver. Security forces must operate far enough from the force being protected to ensure that this force has enough time and space to maneuver to meet or avoid the enemy threat. In practice, the battalion commander will provide depth to his security elements based upon his knowledge of the operations and the size and location of screening forces provided by higher and adjacent units. It is seldom that the infantry battalion can position more than a series of OPs and a screening force. More than likely, just one or the other is employed at battalion level.

(5) Maintain Contact. Once physical contact with the enemy has been established, it must be maintained until the enemy ceases to be a threat or moves out of the area of responsibility. Contact is not voluntarily broken unless ordered by higher headquarters. Enemy forces must not be permitted to surprise the force being protected. If the enemy force moves out of the area of responsibility, action must be taken to inform the adjacent unit and to assist it in establishing contact with the enemy force.

b. One way we can achieve security is through appropriate organization of our forces.

1403. ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY FORCES DURING MOVEMENT

ea. Guard Force. The purpose of a guard force is to provide close-in protection of the main body thereby preventing surprise, observation, or interference by the enemy. It normally is in an offensive situation—primarily in the movement to contact phase when contact is imminent. The commander may employ an advance guard, flank guards, and a rear guard. (See figure 4.)

(1) An advance guard is a security force, primarily offensive in nature, which operates forward of a moving main body. The purpose of the advance guard is to ensure the uninterrupted advance of the main body; protect the main body from surprise; develop the situation; facilitate the advance of the main body by repairing roads and bridges and removing obstacles or locating bypasses; and to cover the deployment of the main body if it is committed to action. The advance guard normally consists of a point, advance party, support units, and a reserve (A small advance guard, a company for example, usually does not have a reserve.). It provides its own flank and rear security. The advance guard normally advances in column until contact is made. It may move continuously or by bounds, but must regulate its movement on the rate of march of the main body and stay within supporting distance of the main body.
(2) A rear guard is a security force that operates to the rear of an advancing or withdrawing main body to protect it from enemy surprise attack or annoyance by defeating, destroying, or delaying the enemy within its capabilities. The rear guard follows the main body at a distance prescribed by the main body commander and usually moves over the same route or routes. It is prepared to intercept and engage enemy forces that attempt to attack the rear of the main body. The rear guard is normally provided by the main body and operates under main body control. During an advance, the rear guard protects the main body logistic units and collects stragglers.

Provided by www.marines.cc
(3) A flank guard is a security force that operates to the flanks of the main body to protect it from direct fire, ground observation, and surprise attack by engaging and defeating, destroying, or delaying the enemy within its capabilities. The flank guard employs offensive, defensive, or delaying action-type operations to accomplish its mission. The flank guard is provided by the main body commander and normally operates under his control. The flank guard regulates its movement on the rate of march of the main body and may move in alternate bounds, successive bounds, or continuous marching. The distance that the flank guard operates away from the main body is not fixed, but it must be far enough to ensure that the main body commander has time and space in which to maneuver to counter any enemy threat.

b. Covering Force. Another type of security force which can be organized is a covering force. It can be utilized in both offensive and defensive situations.

(1) Offensively, it operates at a considerable distance from the force being protected and normally is not employed below division level, is highly mobile and tactically self-contained, possesses its own long-range fire support, and is never smaller than a reinforced battalion. Its purpose is to provide early development of the situation and deceive, delay, disorganize, and defeat the enemy within its capabilities. The covering force engages in any type action necessary to accomplish its mission. Covering force actions are characterized by speed, aggressiveness, and unhesitating attacks to destroy enemy resistance or to seize and hold key terrain which dominates the area or contains large enemy units. However, a covering force must be careful not to become so decisively engaged that it can be overrun, bypassed, or enveloped.

(2) Defensively, a covering force is normally established by force headquarters to provide security forward of the general outpost. When a reinforced division conducts a mobile defense, it normally employs a covering force rather than a general outpost.

1404. ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY FORCES FOR THE POSITION DEFENSE

a. General Outpost. Another way to ensure security, particularly in the linear defense, is to establish security echelons. The security echelon farthest from the forward edge of the battle area (FEDA) is the general outpost (GOP). This is the division's security echelon which occupies positions forming the general outpost. It warns of the approaching enemy and provides time for preparation of main battle area defenses and will delay, deceive, and deny the enemy use of light artillery into the forward defense area. The GOP also assists in covering the withdrawal of any distant covering forces. It may accomplish this mission through observation, fires, obstacles, demolitions, patrolling, and close combat prior to being withdrawn. The GOP is normally located 6 to 12 kilometers forward of the
FEBA and ranges in size from a reinforced battalion to a reinforced regiment and is usually provided from the division reserve. It will normally be reinforced with the necessary combat support/CSS units and may have artillery attached to it or be supported by long-range artillery from within the battle area or from other supportable positions. (See figure 5.)

b. Combat Outpost. The next security echelon, one step closer to the FEBA, is the combat outpost. (See figure 5.) This security echelon is established by the regiment or reinforced battalion and consists of a series of outguards generally located between 1 and 2.4 kilometers forward for the FEBA. Its mission is to provide a counterreconnaissance screen and provide long-range observation and fields of fire. In addition to determining the size, location, and direction of an enemy attack, it must deny the enemy close ground observation and direct fire into the battle area. This security echelon will be covered in greater detail in course 7612, Infantry Operations.

Figure 5. Relationship of COP, GOP, and FEBA.

Provided by www.marines.cc
c. Local Security. This security echelon is the closest to and just forward of the
FEBA. This is the security echelon of the frontline battalions and companies. Local security
is the responsibility of all commanders regardless of their location. The mission of local
security is to provide early warning of attack, detect infiltration, and maintain contact with
the combat outpost and adjacent units. Local security is established throughout the sector of
defense and consists of listening posts, patrols, ambushes, and observation posts between 0 to
400 meters forward of the FEBA.

1405. OBSERVATION AND DETECTION DEVICES
a. In addition to the illumination capability of mortars, artillery, and flare ships
for night operations, the battalion commander has various items of equipment specifically to
increase his organic detection, observation, and surveillance for patrols, OPs, or listening
posts but which are used to augment the commander's overall security effort.

The AN/PPS-15, a newer, lightweight battlefield radar, has replaced both the
AN/TPS-21 and AN/PPS-6. The radar is designed to acquire moving targets under conditions of
reduced visibility such as darkness, fog, bush, and light drizzle. The radar will provide
range and azimuth data on acquired targets within its operational ranges, which are 50-1,000
meters for a moving man, and 50-3,000 meters for a moving vehicle. When a target is detected,
the radar provides the operator with an aural signal. Each signal varies in its
characteristic sounding according to the nature of the acquired target; e.g., moving man,
truck, tank, etc. Well-trained operators learn to recognize acquired targets through
association with their characteristic sound signatures. The radar is portable, weighing 26
pounds in the backpack configuration.

(a) Capabilities. The basic capabilities of the radar are detection of
moving targets, range measurement, and provision of azimuth data. Under conditions of reduced
visibility, the radar helps to overcome the limitations imposed on a Marine's normal vision.
The radar may be operated manually or in the automatic search (scan) mode. By use of a
9-meter cable, the radar's antenna may be listed separately from the operator.

(b) Limitations. The radar is limited in its operation to direct line of
sight with respect to moving targets. Its detection range is constrained by dense foliage,
solid objects, and ground forms. It must not be masked. In the search mode, when the antenna
swings back and forth, the radar's operational capability to acquire targets is limited to a
rather flat plane. It must be elevated or depressed mechanically in order to contour scan.
It will only detect moving targets. It is subject to false alarms; i.e., movements of tree
limbs and foliage or animals, but these may be minimized through operator signal recognition
training. Being an active device, the radar is vulnerable to electronic direction finding,
jamming, and direct attack by fire. Experience indicates that it is desirable to employ the
radars in pairs in order to obtain mutual support, but it is important to ensure that the
radars are carefully sited in order to avoid mutual interference.

Provided by www.marines.cc
(2) The Starlight Scope has proven to be a highly useful and reliable night observation device. (See figure 6.) It is a battery powered sight which can be mounted on a rifle or machinegun to give the operator excellent night visibility. It is NOT infrared, but amplifies existing night light sources such as starlight, moonlight, flares, or reflections, allowing the user to see as though it were daylight. The scope is adjustable and enables the shooter to deliver well-aimed fire at ranges of 200 to 300 meters.

![Figure 6. Starlight Scope Mounted on an M-16.](image)

(3) Although much larger in size, the AN/TVS-4 Night Observation Device (NOD) works on the same principle as the smaller starlight scope. The NOD has a maximum range of 1200 meters under good starlight conditions and 2000 meters under full moonlight. Its field of scan is 360° (mounted on its tripod) and field of view is 80°. The biggest limitation of the NOD is its weight; the NOD itself weighs 35 pounds and the tripod weighs 10 pounds. It is best employed in stationary situations such as defensive positions or where mechanical transportation could be used to transport it. The NOD is located in the Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) platoon of the battalion intelligence section. There are four NODs found in the NOD section of the STA platoon.

(4) A valuable tool in night observation is the AN/TAS-5 night vision sight for the Dragon missile system. (See figure 7.)

![Figure 7. AN/TAS-5 Night Vision Sight.](image)

The night vision sight operates on the terminal imagery by sensing heat from a target and changing it to a picture that is displayed in the sight reticle. The night sight is self contained and is normally carried in a rucksack which has three coolant cartridges and three batteries in it. It can operate in temperatures from -25°C to +125°C and weighs 20.5 pounds.
b. Each Marine division is authorized 720 remote sensors. The term "remote sensors" in this case refers only to those groups of equipment which sense activity and transmit a radio message which is monitored at a remote location. These sensors are designed for either hand emplacement or air delivery. The hand-emplaced category includes seismic, infrared, and magnetic sensors. The air-delivered category includes seismic and acoustic sensors.

(1) There are three types of hand-emplaced seismic sensors found in the division. They have detection ranges of 20 to 30 meters for personnel and 200 to 300 meters for vehicles. They last from one to two months, depending upon the frequency of activations.

(a) Microminiature Seismic Intrusion Device (MICROSID).—This is a recoverable, lightweight, seismic sensor.

(b) Disposable Seismic Intrusion Device (DSID). This is a non-recoverable seismic sensor with the same weight and size as the MICROSID.

(c) Miniature Seismic Intrusion Device (MINISID). This is a recoverable and larger device than the MICROSID and DSID. Ancillary sensors may be attached to the MINISID which then acts as a transmitter.

(2) There are two types of hand-emplaced ancillary sensors that do not have their own transmitter. Both of these are attached to the MINISID which functions as a transmitter.

(a) Add-on-Audio Unit (AAU). This is the only hand-emplaced acoustic sensor in the Marine Corps. Its detection range is the same as the human ear and it has a life expectancy of 45 days.

(b) Magnetic Intrusion Device (MAGID). The MAGID detects the intrusion of personnel up to 4 meters and vehicles up to 25 meters by sensing changes in the ambient magnetic field.

(3) The Marine division has three remote sensors designed for delivery by aircrafts. All three bury into the ground when they strike the earth. Each has a small antenna/camouflaged like a scrub bush which remains above ground.

(a) Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector (Short) (AIDS(D)). The AIDS(D) is a seismic sensor with a detection range of 30 meters for personnel and 300 meters for vehicles. It has a life expectancy of 45 days in continuous operation. It is designed for delivery by low-performance aircraft.

(b) Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector (Normal) (AIDS(N)). The AIDS(N) has the same capabilities as the AIDS(D) except that the AIDS(N) is designed for delivery by high-performance aircraft.

(c) Acoustic Seismic Intrusion Device (ACOUSID). The ACOUSID is a combination acoustic and seismic detector designed for delivery by high-performance aircraft.

SUMMARY

In time of war, we cannot help but suffer some casualties. Casualties are the hard, cold facts of war; however, if these casualties are a result of improper security or a lack of security, it is unforgivable. Tactical security is as equally vital and critical to battlefield success as a wealth of information about the enemy.
CHAPTER 1 EXERCISE 3: Circle the best answer to each test item, 1 through 10. Check your answers with the solutions located at the end of the text.

1. A “fundamental” of security is that the security force
   a. orient on the enemy
   b. avoid engagement with the enemy
   c. orient on the force being secured
   d. operate independently

2. Continuous reconnaissance by security forces
   a. keeps the main body commander informed of enemy locations and movement
   b. provides space for maneuver
   c. is always accomplished with stationary OPs
   d. always requires a mobile screening force

3. A reinforced infantry battalion whose purpose is the early development of the situation and is task organized into a tactically self-contained, highly mobile force and reinforced with long-range fire support is a...
   a. covering force
   b. screening force
   c. general outpost
   d. combat outpost

4. Your battalion, reinforced, is being deployed forward of the FEBA approximately 8 kilometers. Your mission assignment in the security echelon is...
   a. combat outpost
   b. general outpost
   c. local security
   d. march outpost

5. A characteristic of a covering force is that it...
   a. operates close to the main body
   b. is employed by regimental or higher units only
   c. possesses its own long-range fire support
   d. is only capable of defensive-type operations

6. The AN/PPS-15...
   a. affords the operator excellent visibility at night
   b. requires only two men to man-pack and operate
   c. is not limited to line of sight
   d. is organic to the infantry battalion

7. The detection device which amplified existing light sources to produce excellent night visibility is the...
   a. Starlight Scope
   b. Seismic Intrusion Detector
   c. Infrared Weapons Sight
   d. AN/PPS-6 radar

Matching: Questions B through 10, match the lettered remote sensors (Column 1) with the technique which each sensor employs (Column 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. MICROSID</td>
<td>a. Hand-emplaced seismic (no AAU or MAGID attachment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ADSID(N)</td>
<td>c. Hand-emplaced seismic (to which AAU or MAGID may be attached).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Section V. COMMUNICATIONS

1501. GENERAL

Today's complex method of waging war has become so sophisticated that the tactical commander must be able to respond instantaneously to any and all tactical situations if he is to be successful on the battlefield. The commander's ability to make this response is enhanced through employing an integrated communication network which consists of the communication means discussed in 7507, Communications. In this section, we will examine the communication organizations that provide the personnel and equipment used in establishing, operating, and maintaining the integrated communication network contained in an infantry battalion. We will also examine the major systems which comprise the overall network. (See figure 8).

1502. INFANTRY BATTALION COMMUNICATION ORGANIZATION

a. Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company. The communication platoon is organic to the headquarters and service company and is commanded by a captain (MOS 2502). The platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, message center section, wire section, radio section, and tactical air control party section.

   (1) Platoon Headquarters. The communication chief is the platoon sergeant and second in command of the platoon. He assists the communication officer in many ways, particularly in the supervision of training and the administrative handling of personnel. The technicians and repairmen provide second echelon maintenance on organic equipment.

   (2) Message Center Section. The message section provides the nucleus for the battalion communication center. It is responsible for processing messages, maintaining necessary logs, files, and publications and operating the teletype equipment in the battalion communication center and in the battalion fire support coordination center (FSCC). Although there are no cryptographers in the message center section, the message chief (and sometimes the message center supervisor) is cleared and given access to assist the communication officer in processing encrypted traffic.

   (3) Wire Section. The wire section installs and operates the battalion switching center and installs local telephones and lines to subordinate and attached units as required. This section also has the responsibility for the installation of wire lines between multichannel radio equipment and the points where multichannel radio channels terminate within the command post (CP).

   (4) Radio Section. The radio section is responsible for all radio communications used to satisfy the command and control communication requirements at the battalion headquarters, except for the control and coordination of supporting arms.

   (5) TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP) Section. This section provides all the enlisted personnel for the battalion TACP and operates the radio nets required for air support communications. In the field, this section is under the control of an air officer and the two forward air controllers. However, the infantry battalion communications officer is their platoon commander and is responsible for their training and overall performance. There must be close coordination and mutual understanding between the communication officer and the air officer with regard to the training and employment of the TACP section. The TACP section has 19 enlisted men.
Figure 8. Typical Internal and External Radio Communications for an Infantry Battalion.

Notes:
1. A star indicates as required.
2. Only one rifle company tactical net depicted.
3. Net symbols to left of a unit indicate nets to higher echelons, net symbols to right of a unit indicate nets to lower echelons. (less PSC)
1503. COMMUNICATION NETWORKS EMPLOYED BY THE INFANTRY BATTALION

a. Internal Radio Nets. The following nets are used within the infantry battalion organization:

1. Battalion Tactical Net (VHF-FM). This net furnishes the commander with a communications channel for the command and control of his subordinate units. Radio is the primary means of communication between battalion and its subordinate units and with regimental headquarters when there is not enough time to install wire lines. The following internal radio nets are used within the infantry battalion. Stations on this net include the battalion CP, the battalion commander when he is away from the CP, the battalion OP, and the rifle companies. The Dragon Platoon, weapons company, the service platoon, and attached and supporting units may also be required to enter this net. This is a functional net and is normally operated in the S-3 section of the battalion CP. Because the message traffic transmitted over this net is tactical and not generally administrative in nature, it is not processed through the battalion communication center. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the S-3 to arrange for the routing of traffic which is of interest to other staff sections.

2. Rifle Company Tactical Net (VHF-FM). This net provides the company commander with a means to command and control his subordinate units. Stations on this net include company CP, company OPs, rifle platoons, weapons platoon, 81mm mortar section, and attached/supporting units, when directed. Each rifle company is allotted a different frequency. The radio operators are provided by the rifle company.

3. Battalion Mortar Net (VHF-FM). This net links each of the four 81mm mortar platoon's forward observers with the mortar platoon FDC. The mortar platoon commander or his representative, located at the battalion CP within the FSCC, is also on this net. Each of the 81mm mortar sections may also enter the net as required; however, communications between the FDC and the mortar sections are usually provided by a sound-powered telephone loop.
b. External Radio Nets. The following external nets are guarded by the infantry battalion:

1. Regimenal Command Net (HF-SSB). This net provides the regimental commander with a circuit with which he can exercise control of his subordinate units. It is normally used to transmit administrative and logistic messages and is established in the battalion communication center. Stations on this net include the regimental CP, infantry battalions, and attached and supporting units, when directed.

2. Regimental Tactical Net (VHF-FM). This net parallels the regimental command net and provides the regimental commander with a means to exercise tactical control over his subordinate units. Stations included on this net are the regimental CP, regimental commander when away from the CP, the regimental OP, infantry battalions, and attached and supporting units, as directed. Similar to the battalion tactical net, it is basically a functional net and is established in the S-3 section; however, it can be used to transmit administrative and logistic traffic when the situation requires.

3. Division Alert/Broadcast Net (HF). This net serves two purposes. First, it provides a rapid means for the dissemination of air, mechanized, or nuclear attack warnings. Secondly, it is used to pass traffic of a general nature, such as weather reports, which is of interest to several or all division units. Stations which are required to monitor this net include all division units of battalion size and larger. The division station is normally the only transmitting station.

4. As-Required Nets. The battalion is required to guard other external nets as its mission may dictate. These nets include:
   a. Division air observation net (VHF-FM).
   b. Division damage control net (HF-SSB).
   c. Division reconnaissance net (HF-SSB).

c. Fire Support Coordination Radio Nets. These nets discussed in detail in course 7503, Fire Support, and course 7502, Marine Aviation, will not be presented again. However, it should be emphasized that battalion stations on these supporting arms radio nets are located in the battalion FSICC and with the appropriate supporting arm observers who are normally attached to designated assault elements of the battalion.

1504. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

a. The speed and reliability of wire makes it the most desirable means of communication whenever there is sufficient time for its installation. In the case of the infantry battalion, various wire systems are installed during slow-moving offensive situations or when defensive positions are being constructed. In this section, we will examine the wire system employed by the infantry battalion headquarters, the rifle company, and the mortar platoon.
b. Battalion Headquarters Wire System. The wire section of the battalion communication platoon installs one or more switchboards for the battalion switching center, local telephones for the staff sections, lines for the multichannel radio terminals to the points where the channels terminate in the battalion CP, and trunklines between the battalion switchboard, the FSCC switchboard, and the mortar platoon FDC switchboard. Additionally, wire trunklines are installed to the artillery battery FDC when it is attached to the infantry battalion. The direct support artillery battery liaison team installs the switchboard and locals in the battalion FSCC. (See figure 9.)

c. Rifle Company Wire System

(1) Wire is not installed between the battalion CP and the rifle companies in a fast-moving attack situation or when rifle companies are widely separated from the battalion CP. When the speed of the advance is slow, e.g., an attack against a strongly prepared position, night attacks, or an attack in the jungle, it may be feasible to install wire locals to rifle companies from the battalion switching central. In a defensive situation, wire is utilized as a preferred means of communications between the battalion commander and three rifle company commanders. Whenever possible, two wire lines are installed over different routes to the rifle companies. (See figure 1.)

(2) When wire is utilized in the attack, a wireman is assigned to the rifle company. He maintains wire communications between the company commander and the battalion switching central by laying wire from a dispenser as the attack progresses.

(3) In the defense, the wiremen of the battalion communication platoon are normally retained under control of the battalion communication officer. Rifle companies are usually issued man-pack, wire-dispensing equipment, and in a defensive situation, especially at night, a sound-powered telephone loop connecting the company commander with each rifle platoon. Attached sections of the Dragon platoon and 81mm mortar platoon may also be included. This loop is established by personnel of the rifle company.

d. 81mm Mortar Platoon Wire System. The wire section of the battalion communication platoon installs wire between the battalion switching central and the switching central of the 81mm mortar platoon FDC when the mortar platoon wire system is installed. A local line is installed to the battalion observation post when distances and the tactical situation permit. The 81mm mortar platoon installs and operates a switchboard at the platoon FDC. When the situation permits, wiremen from the 81mm mortar sections may install local wire lines from this switchboard to the 81mm forward observers. While wire is the preferred means for conduct-of-fire communications, fast-moving situations usually preclude the use of wire, and dictate the use of the battalion mortar net for conduct of fire. When feasible, every effort is made to install wire for conduct of fire and fire direction purposes in both the attack and the defense. When wire lines are installed, the 81mm mortar platoon installs a switchboard at the platoon FDC to interconnect OP lines and other local telephones as required. (See figure 11.)
Figure 9. Typical Wire-Multichannel Radio Communication Network Established for an Infantry Battalion Headquarters.

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Figure 10. Typical Rifle Company Wire Communication System.

Figure 11. Typical 81mm Mortar Platoon Wire System.
e. Multichannel Radio Communications.—Personnel and equipment are attached to the infantry battalion from the infantry regiment communication platoon to install, operate, and maintain the battalion multichannel (eight-channel) radio terminal, AN/MRD-135, in the regimental multichannel system. Allocation of the channels between regiment and battalion provides for sufficient channels to the battalion switching center for common user service, functional channel(s) among the staff sections of the battalion and regiment, a teletypewriter channel between the battalion and regimental communication centers, channel(s) between FSCCs of the battalion and regiment, and channels for use by the supporting artillery units. The AN/MRC-135 will provide eight channels of communication between the battalion and regimental headquarters; the AN/TRC-166 will provide four channels of communication between the battalion and its supporting artillery unit. Exact channelization for each type of equipment will be found in division COIs, COMMOPSs, COMMPLANs, Paragraph 5 of operation plans/orders, or communication-electronics annexes to operation plans/orders.

1505. SUMMARY

We all know that the primary mission of the infantry battalion is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Communications are the primary means by which we direct and coordinate movement of subordinate units; request, coordinate, and control supporting fires; and provide timely logistic support to achieve maximum combat power on the battlefield.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION TO OFFENSIVE TACTICS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 3 hours

SCOPE: To provide an introduction to the fundamentals of offensive operations at the Infantry battalion and regimental levels.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:
1. Identify the fundamentals of offensive tactics.
2. Describe the types of offensive operations.
3. Describe the basic forms of offensive maneuver.
4. Identify the difference between a main attack and supporting attack and the correct employment of the reserve.
5. Identify the common tactical control measures and reasons for their employment.
6. State the sequence of planning an attack to include:
   a. Troop-leading procedures.
   b. Plan of supporting fires.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Sections I, II, III, IV and V

COMPLETE Chapter Exercise 1 and 2
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION TO OFFENSIVE TACTICS

"Since I first joined the Marines, I have advocated aggressiveness in the field and constant offensive action. Hit quickly, hit hard, and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you. This is the shortest road to victory."

Holland M. Smith
Coral and Brass, 1949
Section I. INTRODUCTION

2101. GENERAL

Offensive means to attack, to exploit enemy weaknesses, and to maintain
the initiative. If successful, it brings victory, whereas the defensive can only avoid
defeat. This chapter is an introduction to offensive tactics at the battalion level.
Our infantry battalion executes its offensive mission, the attack, by a combination
of firepower, maneuver, and shock action. Firepower is provided by organic and
supporting weapons. Maneuver is accomplished by rapid movement of the rifle
companies, moving under the protection of supporting fires or exploiting its
effects, and engaging the enemy in close combat. Shock action is the cumulative
effect of the firepower and the violent assault of the maneuvering companies.
Section II. OFFENSIVE TACTICS

2201. FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE TACTICS

The fundamentals of offensive tactics are general rules evolved from logical and time-proven application of the principles of war.

a. Gain and Maintain Contact. This fundamental is applicable when a force is not in contact with the enemy or when the enemy is attempting to move toward or away from the force. As a matter of first priority, contact with the enemy must be gained and maintained to prevent surprise and to obtain information which facilitates future operations. Once gained, contact with the enemy is not voluntarily broken without authority from higher headquarters, but it may be maintained by observation alone.

b. Develop the Situation. Developing the situation is closely allied to "gain and maintain contact" and consists of those actions necessary to determine the strength, location, composition, and disposition of the enemy that has been encountered. Once physical contact with the enemy is gained and resistance is encountered, immediate and rapid reconnaissance is employed to overcome enemy security forces and to determine the strength and location of the enemy's main defense position. This action provides the commander with accurate information for his continuing estimate of the situation, prevents premature deployment of the main body, and permits engagement of the force under the most favorable circumstances.

c. Exploit Known Enemy Weakness. In situations created by opposing maneuvering forces, each seeking a tactical advantage, the commander avoids enemy strength and reacts with maximum speed and sufficient combat power to take advantage of known enemy weakness to enhance success. Weakness from faulty dispositions, poor morale, insufficient support, or tactical error, as well as numerical strength, should be exploited.

d. Seize or Control Key Terrain. The accomplishment of the offensive mission is often dependent upon the early control or neutralization of key terrain that is essential to accomplishing the mission. However, the possession of key terrain features is only important as far as the advantages accruing therefrom are exploited to destroy the enemy.

(1) The commander seeks to dominate key terrain features which give an advantage of observation, concealment, cover, and fields of fire; enhance maneuver and support control routes required by friendly and enemy forces; allow control without placing forces in static positions; or afford additional security.
(2) In any zone of action, there are apt to be several key terrain features. When planning the tactical maneuver of his forces, the commander normally determines that key terrain or portions thereof which, if seized or neutralized, will produce decisive results. He then concentrates his forces toward the seizure, destruction, or neutralization of that area. Early control of such key terrain permits seizure of the objective area, facilitates destruction of the enemy force, and normally is the objective of the main attack.

(3) Other terrain features outside the zone of action which offer a marked advantage to either friendly or enemy forces are key terrain. The commander ensures control of these terrain features through coordination with friendly adjacent units.

e. Retain the Initiative. A paramount objective of the commander in the offense is to seize and retain the initiative by which he can apply his resources at will to influence the action. Bold and aggressive employment of overwhelming combat power, the achievement of surprise, or the exploitation of enemy errors or weaknesses—all of these serve to gain the initiative. Surprise is always sought and may be gained by choosing an unexpected time, place, direction, type or strength of attack. It is enhanced by deception, maneuver, and mobility. Once the initiative is gained, every effort is expended to retain it. Once lost, the initiative is difficult and costly to regain.

f. Neutralize Enemy Capability to React. Every effort is made to disrupt and neutralize the enemy's capability to react to the commander's tactical dispositions and maneuver. Isolation of the battlefield and destruction of or interference with support and reinforcement actions reduce the enemy's responsiveness, enhance the security of friendly forces, and assist in gaining and retaining the initiative.

g. Advance by Fire and Maneuver. Fire and maneuver is a movement technique involving two or more distinct forces having separate missions, which must be closely coordinated to generate maximum combat power. The mission of the maneuvering force, the more decisive element is to close with and destroy the enemy with fire and shock effect. The mission of the fire support force is to minimize the enemy's capability to interfere with the movement of the maneuver force and, within its capabilities, to neutralize or destroy the enemy.

h. Maintain Momentum. Once the attack is launched, every effort is made to gain and maintain momentum until the objective is secured. Flexibility and speed in the employment of combat power are paramount. The commander attempts to gain the objective in the shortest possible time. Since the attack normally advances unevenly and is more successful in some places than in others, no attempt is made to keep units on line in the attack or to adhere closely to a preconceived plan of attack. Forward movement is not delayed to preserve alignment of units, and every effort is made to drive forward hard at those points where the attack gains ground most easily. Under these circumstances, one unit

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may assist the advance of an adjacent one, especially by fire to the flanks. Enemy forces incapable of jeopardizing the accomplishment of the mission are bypassed or contained with minimum forces. Pressure, applied night and day against a weakening enemy, denies him respite from battle; the ability to execute an orderly withdrawal; the opportunity to recoup losses; or the opportunity to gain the initiative. Failure to capitalize on opportunities will result in slow, inconclusive attacks in which the attacker usually will suffer heavy losses.

1. Concentrate Superior Combat Power at the Decisive Time and Place. Successful offensive action requires the massing of superior combat power at the decisive place and time and the rapid application of this power to destroy the enemy. In the attack, this involves three principal tasks: holding the enemy in position; maneuvering against him to gain an advantage; and, at a decisive time, delivering an overwhelming attack to destroy him. In this last task, the maneuver elements and fires are massed and the reserves committed, if necessary, to generate the maximum possible combat power and overwhelm the enemy. When it becomes necessary for the commander to concentrate his forces, he does so only at the decisive point, in proximity to the enemy and for the shortest possible time. Speed is essential to success since the necessary concentration of forces for the attack tends to present a lucrative target, particularly in nuclear warfare.

j. Exploit Success. Because combat power is relative, commanders on their initiative seek to take advantage of any information, tactical success, or advantage occurring during the attack. Speed of action and reserve combat power are required. The attack plan is vigorously executed and all favorable developments exploited. Failure is not redeemed. If the attack lags in one portion of the zone, the weight of the attack is shifted to the area offering the greatest opportunity for success. The most decisive results are obtained when strong, mobile forces are committed to exploit opportunities deep in the enemy rear.

k. Provide for the Security and Integrity of the Force. Security is always necessary, whether a force is in bivouac, on the march, or in combat. All units are responsible for their security, regardless of the security provided by other units. Actions required are often dictated by the proximity of the enemy; i.e., whether contact is remote, improbable or imminent. However, actions taken should not unnecessarily divert forces or effort from the mission of the force being secured. Security is achieved by providing for detection of the threat; sufficient time and maneuver to react to the threat; and for the avoidance, neutralization, or destruction of the threat. Integrity involves maintaining the command as an effective fighting force. The commander ensures that his forces are not divided so that they may be defeated in detail and that essential support is available to his force.

l. Place Friendly Strength Against Enemy Weakness. This is perhaps the most important of all the fundamentals of the offense. It is a combination of other fundamentals such as concentrate superior combat power at the decisive time and place and retain the initiative. It allows the most impact against the enemy with the least amount of friendly attrition. The enemy is deprived of battlefield success by striking his command and control functions, his artillery batteries, and logistic support. Placing friendly strength against enemy weakness hastens the physical and mental destruction of the enemy.
2202. TERRAIN—A BASIC CONSIDERATION

a. General. Seizure of terrain is a key element in controlling a battle at the battalion level, because the battalion is normally assigned missions which require the seizure or control of specified areas or terrain objectives. In the event nuclear weapons are employed in support of the battalion, terrain, vegetation, cultural features, and soil composition are factors which may influence the nuclear effects desired and, in turn, the scheme of maneuver of the battalion. Likewise, terrain affects possible enemy courses of action. [See Appendix A, Tactical Evaluation of Terrain and Weather.]

b. Military Aspects of Terrain

(1) Key Terrain. The battalion plan of attack is directed toward paid seizure or control of those key terrain features essential to accomplishing the mission and maintaining the speed and momentum of the attack. Key terrain is controlled by securing the approaches to it; by maintaining surveillance over it; by occupying it with minimum forces, when necessary; and, under proper conditions, by neutralizing it by fire or smoke. Remember, heavy concentrations of troops on dominant key terrain features facilitate location by enemy targeting agencies.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation directly determines effectiveness of supporting weapons and influences the dispositions, protective measures, selection of objectives, and control of attacking companies. The availability and utilization of helicopters and observation aircraft reduce, to some degree, the requirement of securing and holding high ground for observation purposes alone. Enemy ground observation may be neutralized by supporting fires when the terrain it occupies for observation is not essential to the scheme of maneuver.

(3) Cover and Concealment. While all of the military aspects of terrain are important when formulating a plan of attack or plan of defense, the careful analysis of cover and concealment is extremely important. Commanders skillfully take advantage of existing cover and concealment to prevent undue casualties from enemy fires, to effect surprise, to restrict observation of friendly movements and strength, and to exploit the terrain in execution of the scheme of maneuver. Likewise, careful consideration is given to cover and concealment used by the enemy and their effect on his possible courses of action.

(4) Obstacles. Ground movements or maneuvers can be seriously impeded by obstacles, unless means available are employed to cross, destroy, or bypass them. Failure to take adequate measures to overcome a major obstacle may allow a small force to canalize and delay movements of a larger force. Every effort is made to overcome the effect of obstacles, including exploitation of surface vehicles, increased amounts of supporting fires, maximum use of reconnaissance and surveillance units, use of helicopters and careful evaluation and planning. Although the helicopter provides the capability of flying over or around obstacles, obstacles, if properly exploited, can assist in canalizing an enemy attack, be used as flank protection, prevent or canalize enemy armor, and prevent the maneuver of major enemy forces.
Avenues of Approach. Avenues of approach are selected to provide for rapid movement of the battalion to its objective, afford cover and concealment, and give sufficient maneuver room for the subordinate elements of the battalion. At times, a less desirable avenue of approach may, if selected, enhance the chance of achieving surprise since avenues of approach may also be the major areas of the enemy’s defensive efforts.

2203. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

a. General. In combat operations we have certain tasks which the offensive must perform. First, we must locate the enemy and we must hold him in position. While we are holding him, we are going to maneuver against him until we gain an advantage, until the decisive time we can destroy him. To accomplish these tasks, we have developed five types of offensive operations: MOVEMENT TO CONTACT, HASTY ATTACK, DELIBERATE ATTACK, EXPLOITATION, AND PURSUIT. All of the tactical fundamentals that you are going to be exposed to will fall somewhere within one of these five types of offensive operations.

All the various tactical functions that you will be learning fall somewhere within these five categories. And, I might add, these apply just as well in Vietnam as they will in the Steppes of Russia in mechanized warfare. These are generalized categories and any tactical technique that we use from this point on falls within one of these five categories. Let’s break them down and take a look at them individually.

b. Movement to Contact

(1) First, the movement to contact is a tactical operation which allows us to gain initial contact with the enemy. Or, if we have had contact previously and lost it, to regain contact with the enemy. The purpose of this movement is to develop the situation - and to allow us to place our troops in an advantageous position in relationship to the enemy prior to engaging in decisive combat. I am not talking about a movement to contact where we move from a line of departure to the objective. This operation may be conducted over many, many miles, but, regardless of how far it is, it will normally be conducted along a broad front in multiple columns. But, the determination as to how we are going to make this movement to contact depends on the imminence of contact and our knowledge of the enemy’s situation.
(2) Let us look at a few examples of the movement to contact. In the first example we might say we are moving in a column across the desert towards enemy positions. Because we are an amphibious force, our movement by ship may be a movement to contact. We may land World War II style by going directly into the teeth of the enemy or we may offset by landing on the beach someplace away from the enemy and build up our combat power from zero to 100% and then make our assault on the enemy. Because of the mobility that the helicopter provides, we may decide to fly over our enemy or around his flanks, to avoid his strong points, and attack him from the rear. Regardless of the type of movement that we make, the move is going to be characterized by rapid and bold advances, always designed to keep the enemy off balance. The movement to contact is designed to place our forces in an advantageous position before we engage in decisive combat.

c. Hasty Attacks

(1) Hasty Attacks proceed from meeting engagements or successful defenses. In either case, the commander deploys and attacks quickly to gain the upper hand or to keep the enemy from organizing resistance. The commander must be organized to make immediate use of every available asset on the shortest possible notice. Speed of attack will offset a lack of thorough preparation, but from the early moments of the meeting engagement, commanders must commit every available element of combat support to the attack.

(2) The actions taken must always be appropriate to the situation. In some instances attacking with one unit and supporting with two will be more advantageous than automatically adopting the standard opposite configuration. Air maneuver, long-range sensors, extended range artillery, scattered mines, and nuclear weapons will increase the speed, impact, and effectiveness of Hasty Attacks.
d. Deliberate Attacks. Deliberate Attacks are usually necessary when the defender is well-organized and cannot be turned or bypassed. Thoroughly prepared Deliberate Attacks are characterized by:

- High volumes of fire
- Good Intelligence
- Extensive preparation of attacking troops
- Well-developed deception plans
- Complete exploitation of electronic warfare
- Unconventional warfare
- Psychological operations

The attacker must be organized in depth to provide operational flexibility. Reserves must be in position and prepared to replace lead units or to exploit success wherever it is achieved. Corps and divisions plan to attack the enemy throughout their areas of influence by blocking the movement of his reserves, destroying his command posts, neutralizing his artillery and preventing the escape of targeted units.

e. Exploitation. The exploitation is normally conducted following a successful flanking attack or a successful penetration. It would be launched when the commander recognizes that the enemy is having difficulty holding onto his position, and it would be conducted in order to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his defense or from conducting a counterattack. The commander may conduct this exploitation in one of two ways.

(1) First, he may use his assault forces to launch the exploitation. If he uses these forces, he must first ascertain that they have accomplished their assigned mission. A major disadvantage in use of these forces is that they must reorganize and be resupplied while on the move. However, in using these forces, the commander would plan for the commitment of his reserve in the event a contingency would arise. An additional advantage in this method is that the reserve would be ready to execute the pursuit phase.
(2) Second, he may employ his reserve in the exploitation. To do this, however, the commander must ensure that the reserve has been task organized for the operation and that they are in a position where they can execute the exploitation. The advantages of employing the reserve include:

(a) They may be employed from a different direction and thereby causing the enemy further confusion.

(b) The use of the reserve through "gaps" either ascertained or created by the main effort can focus a new main effort.

(3) Two important considerations when employing the reserve are:

(a) The reserve is used to exploit success rather than to reinforce failure.

(b) The reserve should be reconstituted as soon as possible.

(4) The exploitation, once it is launched, must be carried out aggressively at all levels. The troops and equipment must be pushed to the limits of their endurance in order to disrupt and destroy the enemy capability to reorganize his defense. The big picture of the exploitation may not seem too important, but at the local level it will certainly make everybody's job a lot easier.

f. Pursuit

(1) Once the enemy has been forced off of his position, the good enemy commander, following his tactical doctrine, will try to fall back a bit, reorganize himself, consolidate his positions, and launch a counterattack. This is part of our tactical doctrine—it is also part of Soviet tactical doctrine. At some point, the enemy commander will recognize that he cannot reconstitute his defenses because of our exploitation activities—he wants to live to fight another day, so he will want to break contact. At this point, we should launch a pursuit operation.
(2) The pursuit differs from the exploitation in that we are no longer trying to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his defense; we are trying to prevent him from breaking contact, and our mission is to destroy him. We accomplish this by using a direct pressure force (as in frontal attacks) or a combination of a direct pressure force and encircling forces (as in an envelopment). While there may be a terrain objective assigned for a pursuit operation, the enemy is usually the objective.

(3) The pursuit is "normally" initiated on approval of higher headquarters. The commander in field who gambles with the odds of completely destroying the enemy or himself becomes entrapped and destroyed as he pursues his enemy further into enemy territory.

g. In addition to the five major types of offensive operations mentioned above, commanders must also be prepared to conduct these special purpose operations:

- Reconnaissance in force
- Raid
- Feint
- Demonstration
- Relief to continue to attack

(1) A Reconnaissance in Force is a limited-objective operation by a considerable force that obtains information and locates and tests enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. Even when the commander is executing a Reconnaissance in Force primarily to gather information, he must be alert to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success. If the enemy situation must be developed along a broad front, the Reconnaissance in Force may consist of strong probing actions to determine the enemy situation at selected points. The enemy’s reactions may reveal major weaknesses in his defensive system. Because Reconnaissance in Force is primarily an information-gathering operation, commanders must carefully assess all risks involved. They must make advance provisions either to extricate the force or to exploit success.
(2) A Raid is an attack into enemy-held territory for a specific purpose other than gaining or holding terrain. The raiding force always withdraws after it accomplishes its mission.

(3) A Feint is a diversionary supporting attack conducted to draw the enemy's attention from the main effort. It is normally executed by brigades and smaller units. Feints are usually shallow, limited-objective attacks that go in before or during the main attack.

(4) A Demonstration is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought. It is similar to a feint, but it does not make contact with the enemy.

(5) A Relief to Continue the Attack is conducted to bring fresh troops forward to continue offensive operations, to introduce a new unit into combat, to avoid excessive radiation exposure, or to decontaminate forces that have been exposed to chemical munitions. While any pause in the attack is detrimental to success, special circumstances may dictate such a relief. Commanders conduct such an operation after objectives have been seized, units have dispersed, and enemy counterattacks are unlikely. An offensive relief can be a forward passage of lines, an area relief, or a relief in place. Forward passage of lines and area relief are more common in the offense than relief in place.

6. We have gone quickly through the five types of offensive operations and special purpose operations. As I stated, they encompass all the various types of tactical functions that you may execute. I think the most important of these five types of OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS are the HASTY AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS. The same principles apply to both attacks. The effect sought on the objective is the same. The differences lie in the amount of planning, coordination, and preparation prior to execution—in other words, how thoroughly the principles can be applied, not whether they apply. Therefore, because the HASTY ATTACK may be the rule rather than the exception, commanders, staffs, and units should be trained to react quickly. Commanders must seek to achieve as much as a well-planned and well-executed DELIBERATE ATTACK can achieve despite the constraints of time and information. In practice, a clear distinction seldom exists between a HASTY ATTACK and a DELIBERATE ATTACK. Once commanders decide to attack, any time taken to prepare, plan, issue instructions, and realign allows the defender additional time to react and make his defeat more difficult.
2204. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVERS

a. General. Maneuver is the movement of combat power. Only through maneuver can we position our military resources so that we apply the principle of mass at the decisive point and time. There are two general ways of maneuvering a force in the offense, depending on the direction that the commander can move to attack the enemy. In maneuvering to the front, the commander may employ either a penetration or a frontal attack. When maneuvering to the flanks, he may employ some form of the envelopment. These methods are called forms of maneuver and aid the commander in visualizing his scheme of maneuver when formulating a plan of attack.

b. Penetration

(1) A penetration is an attack through some portion of the enemy's defensive position and is directed against an objective in his rear. (See figure 12.) The penetration is utilized when the enemy is in a position where his flanks are unassailable, or he is overextended, or where there is insufficient time to make an envelopment. The penetration of an enemy defensive position usually progresses in three phases.

(a) The original breakthrough in which the forward defenses of the enemy's position are ruptured. This task is accomplished by the force making the main attack.

(b) The widening of the gap to permit employment of additional forces. This may be accomplished by reserve forces.

(c) The seizure of objectives through the gap. This may be accomplished by the original main attack force or a newly committed unit.

(2) In a penetration, the overall attack is launched initially on a wide front in order to fix the enemy and to deceive him as to the exact location of the main attack. The main attack is a powerful, violent attack on a narrow front and in considerable depth. The supporting attack is made on one or both sides of the main attack with the purpose of fixing and deceiving the enemy.

(3) Normally, an infantry regiment or larger unit is used as the main attack force when the attack is against a well-organized enemy position. The infantry battalion may participate in any step of a penetration. The penetration may end in disaster if insufficient numbers of troops or inadequate fire support is available to continue the momentum of attack.

(4) Reserves should be immediately available to secure the flanks of the main attack and to maintain the momentum of the attack.
Figure 12. Penetration.
(5) The penetration usually is followed by exploitation of the breakthrough which is best accomplished by mobile forces. Most frequently, the exploiting forces consist of units that have been held in reserve.

c. Frontal Attack

(1) Whereas a penetration is planned as a sharp attack to rupture the enemy position, a frontal attack is designed to achieve tactical success along an entire front. Since it is seldom possible to exert sufficient pressure over a great area to overwhelm the enemy by conventional means, frontal attacks are usually confined to supporting attacks with the primary purpose of maintaining pressure and thus preventing enemy disengagement.

(2) At battalion and lower echelon, the frontal attack may be used more often than other forms of maneuver. When the enemy situation is not known, the battalion commander may choose to seek out enemy weaknesses by means of a frontal attack. In other instances, the requirement for speed of movement may restrict the time available to deploy sufficiently for an envelopment or concentrate sufficiently for a penetration. (See figure 13.)

Figure 13. Frontal Attack.
(3) Frontal attacks by large forces, unless executed in overwhelming strength, are seldom decisive. Consequently, their adoption as a main attack in place of a more decisive and less costly form of maneuver is seldom justified.

d. Envelopment

(1) In the envelopment, the main or enveloping attack passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to seize objectives which cut his escape routes and subject him to destruction in position from the flank or rear. Supporting attacks hold the enemy in position during the advance of the enveloping attack. The envelopment forces the enemy to fight in two or more directions simultaneously to meet the converging attacks.

(2) The envelopment by ground attack requires that the enemy have an assailable flank. An assailable flank is one which can be circumvented without fighting a major engagement.

(3) The success of the envelopment depends largely upon surprise, mobility, and the ability of supporting attacks and deceptions to hold the enemy in place. Surprise is gained by secrecy, deception, unexpected maneuver, and speed. Mobility is increased by employment of helicopters, tanks, amphibious vehicles, motorized units, and the skillful use of terrain.

(4) Rapid movement of the enveloping force to its objective is essential to prevent the enemy's movement of reserves to counter or to occupy previously prepared positions.

(5) The enveloping force moves rapidly into the attack, while diversionary actions mask the noise and direction of its movement. The attack may be launched simultaneously across the front or the times of the supporting and enveloping attacks may be staggered, those of the supporting attacks normally being earlier to increase deception. Because of limited targets, inability of local forces to impede the attack in the area of the enveloping force, and the requirement for secrecy, a preparation might not be fired in support of the enveloping force. If fired, it is violent but of short duration. The supporting attacks also may be preceded by preparation fires. The enveloping force moves rapidly and directly to its objective, bypassing enemy forces which might delay it. These forces are reduced by fires or by following units. Security forces protect its exposed flanks.

(6) Supporting attacks and fires hold the enemy in position and prevent his use of reserves against the enveloping force. If the enemy attempts a frontal attack, the supporting attack blocks or delays it while the enveloping force continues the envelopment.
(7) If the enemy attempts to envelop the enveloping force or extend his flank beyond it, the battalion commander may elect to penetrate the enemy's overextended front. This takes advantage of the weakness offered by the enemy in reacting against the envelopment. However, an attempt to outflank the enemy's extension may lead to overextension of the battalion or a dangerous separation of the enveloping force from the supporting attack. (See figure 14.)

e. Double Envelopment

(1) A double envelopment is a variation of the envelopment and is executed by two enveloping attack forces and a supporting attack force. A simultaneous envelopment of both flanks, although a decisive maneuver, generally requires a great preponderance of force and is frequently difficult to control. The extensive use of supporting weapons in a double envelopment will reduce the force required, as well as save time in its execution. (See figure 15.)

(2) The battalion seeking to execute a double envelopment must be capable of deploying on a broad front against an enemy on a narrower front or with little capability of maneuver. The maneuver is executed by making a frontal attack in the center while striking with the main attack around both flanks. When helicopterborne forces are available in reserve, they may complete the envelopment by an attack from the rear. After an initial envelopment of one flank, favorable conditions for passing to a double envelopment through the use of reserves may be created when success has placed the enemy in a disadvantageous situation.

Figure 14. Single envelopment.
f. Turning Movement

(1) In a turning movement, the attack force seeks to pass around the enemy's main force to secure an objective deep in his rear. The depth of the objective and the purpose of the maneuver—to compel the enemy to abandon his position or to divert major forces to meet the threat—distinguish the turning movement from the envelopment. However, the turning movement is considered as just a variation of the envelopment. With the helicopter capability, the turning movement is practicable to a degree not possible for less mobile forces. If the battalion constitutes the turning force, it must be self-sufficient to the extent that it can operate beyond reinforcing and supporting distance of other ground forces for the requisite period of time. (See figure 16.)

(2) The turning movement may be decisive in situations in which an opportunity exists to seize vital areas before the main enemy force can withdraw or be reinforced. In addition to the requisite mobility, this maneuver requires surprise.

(3) Turning movements usually are executed by units larger than the battalion, but a helicopterborne battalion may constitute the turning force, or the battalion may be employed as part of a force executing the secondary attack.
2205. DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES

a. General

(1) The forms of maneuver are classical patterns which aid the commander in the planning and visualization of his scheme of maneuver. After analyzing these patterns, the next task in planning an attack is to determine the distribution of forces. To achieve the required superiority in the attack of a selected area, the battalion commander determines the most effective distribution of his forces.

(2) Normally, the principal tasks are accomplished by three task groupings:

(a) Main attack.
(b) Supporting attack.
(c) Reserve.

Figure 16. Turning Movement.
However, it must be made clear that all attacks do not have main and supporting attacks. Supporting attacks must assist the main attack. Essentially, they employ minimum force to keep the enemy occupied in order to permit massing the main attack. However, particularly with nuclear weapons, the total combat power available may provide such superiority that the entire force can move directly to the objective without resorting to supporting attacks to fix and deceive the enemy. A commander may feel that he cannot make a decision as to just where the main attack should be made. If so, an unweighted attack may be made and the main and supporting attacks developed as the situation unfolds.

b. Major Task Groupings

(1) Main Attack. The main attack designed to accomplish the primary task assigned the battalion. This attack receives first priority in the allocation of combat power. The principle of mass is illustrated by use of the main attack. Companies and supporting fires are assigned to the main attack to accomplish the following:

(a) Achieve decisive superiority over the enemy on the objective or in the area against which the main attack is directed.

(b) Maintain the momentum of the attack to the battalion objective.

(c) Prevent use of key terrain by the enemy. This consideration also applies to secondary attacks and reserves.

(2) Supporting Attack

(a) The supporting attack element is organized to render maximum assistance to the main attack. It accomplishes this by holding the enemy in position and preventing desengagement, by deceiving him as to the location of the main attack, and by forcing him to commit his reserve prematurely or at an indecisive point. The supporting attack also might seize terrain which will contribute to the success of the main attack, as in protecting a flank. The supporting attack must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall mission.

(b) The purpose of the supporting attack is to assist the main attack usually by seizing limited objectives. However, when developing a course of action, it is necessary always to be sure that the success of the main attack is not wholly dependent on the success of the supporting attack; if such is the case, it is probable that the so-called supporting attack is, in reality, a main attack. For example, if you plan a main attack over terrain that is controlled by a hill which is occupied by the enemy in such strength that your "main" attack can't go until the supporting attack seizes the hill, you may have an unsound course of action. It may be necessary to divert strength from the main attack to assist the "supporting" attack, thus, in effect, making it your main attack.
(c) The principle of economy of force must be kept in mind in making the allocation of forces or combat power for the supporting attack. The force must be strong enough to accomplish the mission, but the main attack and the reserve must not be unnecessarily weakened in order to provide such a force. The supporting attack contains the minimum essential combat power to accomplish its mission, but must be strong enough to avoid defeat.

(3) Reserve. Ideally, the reserve is used primarily to ensure victory or exploit success. It provides the commander with the necessary flexibility to influence the action once the attack has started. The reserve is used to meet unexpected enemy threats and to accomplish missions such as flank security or unit replacement. It is used to maintain the momentum of the attack and to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy. The reserve must have the necessary mobility to allow it to concentrate rapidly, to move to the place of commitment rapidly, and to disperse rapidly. The reserve is located to favor the main attack. The reserve may be assigned a mission directing it to prepare to occupy blocking positions or to provide flank security for the command. However, these elements must be ready at all times to concentrate rapidly. The reserve may also be used to mop up enemy resistance bypassed by other battalion units. Passing the reserve through units that have been stopped by enemy action is avoided whenever possible; rather, reserves should be committed from a new direction to achieve surprise and avoid confusion.
CHAPTER 2 EXERCISE 1: Circle the best answer to questions 1 through 7. Check your answers with the solutions located at the end of the text.

1. All of the following are "general rules" of offensive combat except _________.
   a. retain the initiative
   b. coordinate the attack
   c. maintain momentum
   d. exploit success

2. At the battalion level, key terrain, as a basic consideration, is controlled by several factors, including _________.
   a. heavy concentration of troops
   b. movement to contact
   c. integrity of the force
   d. maintaining surveillance over it

3. While the purpose of the exploitation is to destroy the enemy's ability to reconstitute an organized defense or to conduct a counterattack, the purpose of the pursuit is _________.
   a. harass the enemy
   b. seize the enemy's logistic support
   c. prevent the enemy from disengaging and destroy him
   d. keep the enemy retreating

4. Which type of offensive operation obtains information and locates and tests enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions?
   a. Movement to contact
   b. Envelopment
   c. Turning movement
   d. Reconnaissance in force

5. Your battalion has been assigned the mission of a supporting attack and you have decided to attack along a wide front. The form of maneuver employed is _________.
   a. penetration
   b. turning movement
   c. frontal attack
   d. envelopment

6. Compelling the enemy to abandon his position or to divert major forces to meet the threat is the purpose of _________.
   a. frontal attack
   b. penetration
   c. envelopment
   d. turning movement

7. In assigning missions to your reserve force, you should strive to avoid, whenever possible, assigning the mission of _________.
   a. preparing and occupying blocking positions
   b. passing through and assuming the mission of a unit stopped by enemy action
   c. reinforcing and exploiting the initial success of a penetrating force
   d. reducing enemy resistance bypassed by the attacking echelon
Section III. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES AND THEIR GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION

2301. GENERAL

Tactical control measures are the means whereby the commander prescribes location and movement of his subordinate elements. When used in conjunction with fire control measures, such as the coordinated fire line (CFL) and fire support coordination line (FSCL), the commander is able to direct the fires and maneuver of his unit without resorting to lengthy explanations of what he wants done and why. Tactical control measures, as used by the commander, are susceptible to graphic portrayal and are known as military symbols. A military symbol is a condensed pictorial representation of a particular unit, installation, activity, or piece of equipment and is used to accurately identify an item of operational interest. These symbols are used as a pictorial shorthand in the preparation of overlays and situation maps. Since any control measure is restrictive in nature, it is important that the commander use as many as may be necessary to ensure control of his unit but no more than are necessary; in essence, the commander must exercise as much control as necessary to ensure the accomplishment of his mission while, at the same time, avoiding overcontrol of his subordinate units.

2302. MILITARY SYMBOLS

The following military symbols are those most commonly used in conjunction with mapping and overlay techniques. Both offensive and defensive overlay techniques are displayed.

a. Size. To indicate the size of a specific unit or activity, the appropriate size notation is placed above or beside the unit or installation symbol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Notation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Size Notation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>XX XX XX</td>
<td>Regiment, group, or equivalent</td>
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<tr>
<td>• •</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>• • •</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>XX XX</td>
<td>Division/wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>Company/ Battery</td>
<td>XX XX</td>
<td>Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Battalion or Squadron</td>
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</table>

Provided by www.marines.cc
b. **Tactical Unit Symbols**

3d Marine Amphibious Force

2d Marine Division

82d Airborne Division

4th Marine Amphibious Brigade

9th Marines

2d Marine Amphibious Unit

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

Co A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines

Btry H, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines

2d Marine Aircraft Wing

Marine Aircraft Group 31

Marine Aircraft Group 36

Marine Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron 3

2d Battalion, 23d Marines (Rein)

2d Marines (Minus, Rein)

Co A, 4th Tank Battalion (Minus)
Observation Post (OP), 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

NOTE: Symbols for other types of military units may be found in FM 21-30, Military Symbols.

c. Command Posts (CPs)

Present location

Future location

CP location reported

NOTE: Exact location depicted by the base of the staff.

d. Assembly Areas

CP location not reported.

Proposed, unoccupied

e. Lines

Coordinated fire line
(Formerly no-fire line)

Fire support coordination line

Restricted fire line
(Formerly fire coordination line) (Depicted in Red)

NOTE: Effective time may be placed on one end.
Final coordination line

Probable line of deployment (control measure for night operations)

Limit of advance (control measure for night operations)

Forward troop disposition (blue/black - friendly; red - enemy)

NOTE: Forward friendly dispositions may be placed at both ends when there is no contact with the enemy. FFD is not used in conjunction with line of departure (LD).

Enemy forward troop disposition

Enemy trench system

Trace of enemy thinly held and patrolled frontlines

Trace of thinly held and patrolled frontlines

Phase line

NOTE: Phase lines extend through all lateral boundaries, and are named. Any name is applicable as long as all are consistent.

Coordinating point

Forward edge of the battle area (general trace)

76 Provided by www.marines.cc
Forward edge of the battle area (specific trace)

Forward edge of the battle area (mobile defense)

Combat outpost line (general trace)

General outpost line (general trace)

Light line

Infiltration lanes (2d Battalion, 23d Marines)

Line of contact

Line of departure (always shows effective time of crossing)

Line of departure is line of contact

Line of departure is present positions

**f. Areas or Positions**

Assembly Area (Co A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines)
Proposed, future, or unoccupied assembly area

Occupied attack position

Occupied company blocking or defensive position

Combat service support area

Beach support area

Landing zone (LZs have traditionally been named after birds or trees, but this is not mandatory as long as names are consistent within the same operational plan)

TAOR. The tactical area of responsibility is a control measure establishing a specific area on the ground. A commander assigned a TAOR is responsible for the positive control, conduct, and coordination of all activities within its periphery. The boundary outlining the TAOR is located on recognizable terrain and includes terrain features essential to operations of the responsible unit. It should be large enough to include terrain necessary for the maneuver and support of the force, including reconnaissance and surveillance measures necessary for target acquisition and security. All fires or maneuver conducted within the TAOR or whose effects impinge upon it must be coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the TAOR.
(1) Symbols, as necessary, should be drawn within the boundary to identify the unit assigned the TAOR. Normally, units operating within a TAOR may take under fire targets of opportunity outside the TAOR unless restrictions are placed by higher authority. The responsibility for delineation of such restrictions rests with the commander assigning the TAOR. Should the commander assigning the TAOR desire to place such fire restrictions on the unit operating within the TAOR, the boundary would be treated as any other lateral boundary and depicted as shown below.

The control measure depicted above would be used when other friendly elements are working adjacent to the TAOR, when anticipating linkup operations, or if the TAOR has coincidental boundaries with adjacent units. In the latter case, if the senior authority assigning the TAOR desires to remove fire restrictions for the TAOR commander along the noncoincidental boundaries, he must spell these out in the operation order.

(2) The TAOR is a control measure to be used either in offensive or defensive operations to give the infantry commander additional flexibility to meet enemy disposition, to take advantage of unique terrain configuration, or in conducting economy of force type operations where he is responsible for large pieces of terrain without the troop strength to physically occupy all of the ground.

9. DIRECTION MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXAS</th>
<th>Primary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANSAS</td>
<td>Alternate</td>
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</table>

Helicopter Lanes

Direction of attack

Axes of advance

Main supply route

Provided by www.marines.cc
OVERLAY TECHNIQUES

a. General

(1) Use of Solid or Broken Lines. When the location of a unit, installation, or coordinating detail (for example, line of departure or boundary) is in effect, or is effective by the order being prepared, the appropriate symbol is shown by solid lines. The symbol indicating any proposed or future location, or coordinating detail to become effective at a later time, will be shown by broken lines. An exception to this is the CFL which is always a dashed line.

(2) Checkpoint. A checkpoint is a predetermined point on the earth's surface used as a means of controlling movement, a registration target for fire adjustment, or a reference for location. Easily recognized features such as crossroads, stream junctions, hills, and bridges are used as checkpoints. By referring to these points, a commander may rapidly and accurately report locations, position subordinate units, or call for fire. A subordinate is not required to report his arrival at or near a checkpoint (even if it lies on his prescribed route) unless he is specifically ordered to do so. Checkpoints are designated by random numbers and are shown graphically as a circled number as follows:

(3) Contact Point. A contact point is a point designated between units or axes where the commander desires the units to make physical contact. Contact points may also be used to delineate areas of responsibility in specific localities when boundaries are obviously unsuitable; for example, between elements of a flank guard. In attack situations, contact points may be used during the consolidation of an objective to designate where units will coordinate the organization of the position. Contact points are shown graphically as follows:

(4) Passage Points (Passage of Lines). Passage point(s) will be located where the command(s) desires subordinate units to physically execute the passage of lines. They may be designated along the line of contact of the FIBA of the unit being passed through. Passage points are shown graphically as follows:
(5) Phase Line. A phase line (PL) is a line used for control and coordination of military operations, usually along a terrain feature extending across the zone of action, generally perpendicular to the direction of movement. A subordinate unit commander must report arrival of his leading elements at a PL established by a senior. Should a commander desire a subordinate to stop at a PL or to report clearance of a PL by rear elements of his column, he must so order. In a daylight attack, phase lines are normally used in a rapidly moving or fluid situation when a commander desires to remain abreast of the progress of his forward elements or to restrict or coordinate their movement toward the enemy. Phase lines are shown graphically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PL GOAT</th>
<th>PL GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PL ALFA</td>
<td>PL ALFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL TWO</td>
<td>PL TWO</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(6) Attack Positions. An attack position is the last covered position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the line of departure. An attack position must be able to contain the assault echelon, either company or platoon, in the formation it will use when crossing the LD. It is occupied for only a brief period in order to complete final preparation for the attack. Except in closely controlled attacks—the night attack and counterattack—the assaulting subordinate units are normally allowed to select their own attack positions if they feel the need to occupy one. In closely controlled attacks, the commander ordering the attack will normally select attack positions for his subordinate assault elements. An attack position is shown as follows:

| ATK |

(7) Boundaries

(a) Boundaries are used in both offensive and defensive operations to designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is responsible. Within his own boundaries and unless otherwise restricted, a unit commander enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver. In addition, no unit may fire into or maneuver within an adjacent area unless such fires and maneuver are coordinated with the unit to whom the area is assigned. Boundaries define the zone of action, the sector of defense, and the TAOR. Although it is not doctrine, most units in the field establish a policy that all supporting fire within a given distance of a boundary must be cleared by the adjacent unit. The distance designated is normally 500 or 1,000 meters.
(b) In offensive operations, boundaries defining a zone of action extend only as far as the particular situation requires. They are usually drawn along easily recognizable terrain features in such a manner that division of responsibility for key terrain features is avoided. The zone should include desirable approaches to the objective(s) and allow for necessary dispersion and freedom of action. Boundaries should extend beyond the final objective to the depth necessary for coordination of fire support and for the seizure and consolidation of the objective.

(c) In defensive operations, boundaries define the sector of defense. The boundaries between forward companies divide the battalion frontage according to the natural defensive strength and relative importance of the defense areas. Boundaries are located to avoid division of responsibility for the defense of key terrain features or avenues of approach. Every effort is made to give forward companies equal defensive tasks within their capabilities.

1 If the forward companies are responsible for the combat outpost, boundaries between companies are extended beyond the FEBA to the limit of effective ground observation of the combat outpost. If the combat outpost is under battalion control, the battalion boundaries will extend to the limit of effective ground observation of the combat outpost, but the boundary between companies will stop short of the combat outpost line.

2 Regimental boundaries are extended forward to the range of direct support fires or limits of ground observation, whichever is greater, and indicate the foremost limit of territorial responsibility.

3 Division boundaries are extended through the general outpost line to the range of weapons supporting all divisional units, including that of artillery attached to or supporting the general outpost line.

4 Boundaries are extended to the rear of the FEBA to provide space for reserves, maneuver, and location of command and logistic support facilities. A graphic rear boundary aids in delineating the responsibility for an area. Although battalion and company rear boundaries are established by the rearward extension of lateral boundaries, they are drawn whenever designation of such boundaries is essential for clear delineation of responsibility as related to the terrain; i.e., when guerrillas are active, when a threat of infiltration and airborne attack exists, or when terrain or location of facilities dictates. A company rear boundary should not be shown as a routine procedure, but should be shown only as required. Battalion rear boundaries are frequently drawn to delineate areas of responsibility. Rear boundaries are normally drawn for regiment and are habitually drawn for division and higher units.
(d) A boundary is broken by a unit symbol to show the size and designation of the highest echelon units which have the boundary in common. If the units are of unequal size, the symbol of the higher unit is shown and the designation of the lower is given completely to show its size. Boundaries between units of equal and unequal size are shown as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(BLT l/24)} \\
\text{(BLT 1/24)}
\end{array}
\]

(8) On Order. If the zone of action or sector of defense will be made effective at some time following the effective time of the operation order or plan, the boundary is shown as effective on order or based on some contingency such as the seizure of an objective. A boundary that is effective on order is shown graphically as follows:

\[
\text{----} \quad \text{----}
\]

\text{EFF ON ORDER}

(9) Axis of Advance

(a) An axis of advance arrow should extend only as far as this form of control is essential to the overall plan. Normally, it is depicted from the LD to the objective following in avenue of approach. The axis of advance conveys to the commander to which it is assigned that his unit is expected to attack along the axis and not allow small enemy forces to delay the advance to and seizure of the objective. It further indicates that the commander may maneuver his forces and place his fires freely to either side of the axis, to avoid obstacles, to engage the enemy, or to bypass enemy forces of such strength that could not threaten his security or jeopardize the accomplishment of his mission. The commander ensures that such deviation does not interfere with adjacent units, that his unit remains oriented on the objective, and that the location and size of bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher headquarters. Boundaries may be assigned as an additional control measure when using the axis of advance if the situation so dictates.

(b) A commander need not employ his unit in a single column on his assigned axis; he may designate the assigned axis as the axis of advance for one maneuver unit and designate an additional axis for another maneuver unit, or he may designate two axes of advance following generally the assigned axis. Care must be exercised in assigning additional axes to minimize the possibility of interference with adjacent units.

(c) In armor and mechanized operations, this control measure is most frequently used against light, disorganized, or discontinuous enemy resistance, such as may be encountered in the exploitation or pursuit, and where the need for a closely coordinated attack does not exist.
(d) Graphic portrayal is shown below.

\[
\text{LD is LC}
\]
\[
\text{X-Ray}
\]
\[
\text{OBJ}
\]

(Indicates axis is in effect or made effective by order being prepared.)

(Indicates axis will become effective at some later time or on order.)

(e) To differentiate between a ground axis of advance and a helicopterborne assault axis of advance, a twist is placed in the shaft of the open arrow symbolic of a propeller.

(10) Direction of Attack. A direction of attack is prescribed when a commander considers it essential to specify the direction which the main attack or center of mass of a subordinate unit will follow. A direction of attack is a very restrictive control measure in that the unit to which it applies must move the bulk of its forces in the prescribed direction and cannot bypass enemy encountered. It is normally used in closely controlled attacks such as the night attack and counterattack. The direction of attack is usually expressed verbally as an azimuth and graphically as an unlabeled arrow extending from the line of departure to the objective. When a unit is ordered to seize successive objectives with the bulk of its forces moving along a certain line, a continuous arrow or a series of arrows connecting the objectives may be used. The size of the arrow does not indicate whether the subordinate unit is making the main or a supporting attack for the command as a whole. Direction of attack arrows are shown graphically as follows:

\[
\text{OBJ}
\]
\[
\text{LD}
\]
(11) Route.—A route is a road or track, plus bridges, used when moving from one place to another. Routes are commonly used in troop movements, patrols, counterattacks, movement to contact, and withdrawal operations. Routes may be designated as primary or alternate and are shown graphically as follows:

- Route of Advance (3/8)
- Route of Withdrawal (WHITE)
- Route of March (LINCOLN)

(12) Coordinating Point.—A coordinating point is a designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent units/ formations must make contact for purposes of control and coordination. In normal ground operations, coordinating points are almost exclusively used by a commander to prescribe the locations at which he desires subordinate commanders to coordinate observation and fires in a defensive situation. In this context, labeled coordinating points are placed on boundaries to prescribe the general trace of the FEBA and the combat outpost (COP). Battalion commanders designate coordinating points on their company boundaries at the FEBA and, when the forward companies control the COP, designate coordinating points on company boundaries at the COP. A coordinating point should be located at or near a terrain feature easily recognizable both on the ground and on a map. Commanders coordinate at these points and determine whether the area between their units should be covered by fires, barriers, physical occupation, or a combination of these means. When subordinate commanders believe that a coordinating point should be relocated, they recommend a change to the commander who designated it. Battalions may, without permission from higher headquarters, refuse their flanks from designated coordinating points on the FEBA to obtain adequate security. Flanks must not be refused to the extent that fires cannot be coordinated with adjacent commanders well enough to achieve a continuous defense. Effective surveillance must be maintained in the gaps between battalions. Coordinating points are shown graphically as follows:
(Division responsible for manning GOP, regiments responsible for COP. Boundary is extended beyond the COP to the limits of ground observation from the COP.)

(Battalions responsible for control of COP. The company boundaries are stopped short of the COP; battalion boundaries extend past the COP.)
2304. AREA CONTROL MEASURES

a. Objectives. An objective is a designated area which must be controlled. Physical occupation of an entire assigned objective is not necessary. When the objective is large in relation to the size of the unit to which it is assigned, the unit may seize only the dominant terrain within or adjacent to it and control the rest of the objective by fire. Objectives are usually key terrain features the seizure of which facilitates the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Objectives are shown as follows:

(1) Objectives are also assigned to facilitate destruction of the enemy and to control the attack. Care must be used to ensure that subordinate units are not unduly restricted by the assignment of objectives which do not contribute to these tasks.

(2) Objectives may be designated to provide for the seizure of:

(a) Terrain features which dominate all or a major portion of the unit's zone.

(b) Terrain features upon which prolonged and difficult combat is anticipated, indicating a need for reorganization.

(c) Terrain features which facilitate control of subordinate units.

(d) Terrain features necessary for positioning of units and weapons for the purpose of closely coordinating an attack.

(e) Terrain which will ensure control of the assigned objective. Communication centers, key installations, and enemy-held positions may also be designated as objectives. Communication centers assume greater importance in fluid situations because of their impact on ground mobility.

(3) When assigned an objective, the unit is required to control, but not necessarily to physically occupy the entire objective.
(4) There are several desirable characteristics of objectives which the commander should consider before selecting or designating an objective:

(a) Can it be seized within time and space available?
(b) Does it provide for the destruction of the enemy?
(c) Does it provide for convergence of effort of maneuvering forces?
(d) Does the seizure of this objective facilitate future operations?
(e) Is the objective easily recognizable on the ground as well as on the map?

(5) Commanders at each level are careful to select only objectives which are actually needed, in the realization that subordinate commanders will select those intermediate objectives that they will need to assist in controlling their units and aid in seizing the final objective. Only the minimum necessary are designated since their seizure may slow the attack, restrict maneuver, or cause excessive massing.

b. Zone of Action. A zone of action is a tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which is assigned to a tactical unit. Generally applied to offensive combat, it provides for maximum freedom of fire and maneuver. Zones of action assigned to subordinate units prevent interference among units operating in adjacent areas. At platoon and squad levels, the zone of action is frequently expressed as a frontage. At company level and above, a zone of action is normally defined by a line of departure, an objective (or objectives), and a boundary on one or both flanks. A battalion zone of action is shown graphically as follows:
The example below portrays a zone of action for the 3d Marines conducting a combination helicopter-borne and surface assault. PL GOOSE and the "on order" boundaries give the 2d Battalion CO the means to control the forward rate of advance of his companies and provides inherent flexibility in changing the plans should circumstances beyond OBJ 2 warrant.

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**c. Sector of Defense.** The sector of defense is that defense area, designated by boundaries, within which a unit operates and for which it is responsible. It is the defensive equivalent of the zone of action used in offensive operations. In general, the same restrictions apply to boundaries in defensive operations as apply in offensive operations; one commander is responsible for the coordination of all fires and maneuver employed inside the boundaries. The commander to whom the sector is assigned is not required to occupy the entire sector. He is responsible, however, to control the battle area which is defined as that area organized for defense by a single forward committed unit and which extends rearward from the FEBA to the unit's rear boundary or to the rearward extension of the lateral boundaries. That portion of the sector of defense which is forward of the FEBA is called the security area. A commander to whom a sector of defense is assigned is responsible for maintaining security forces within his security area. A battalion sector of defense is shown graphically as follows (the example battalion is responsible for controlling the COP):
Section IV. PLAN OF ATTACK

2401. GENERAL

Control measures are means available to the commander by which he initially determines the conduct of the attack. The use of these tactical control measures is the means by which a commander will accomplish or influence the attack. In developing the plan of attack, which consists of the scheme of maneuver and the plan of fire support, the commander performs certain troop-leading procedures which ensure concurrent planning by his subordinate unit leaders.

2402. TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURE

Troop-leading procedure is a logical sequence of actions and thought processes followed by the commander in developing and executing a tactical plan. Its purpose is to ensure that the commander makes the best use of time, equipment, and personnel in accomplishing the mission. The sequence of troop-leading procedure is only a guide which may be modified to fit the existing situation. Depending on the time available, the mission, or other influencing factors, the commander will modify the amount of detail or degree of consideration that each step of troop-leading procedure receives. Time is one of the leader's most important considerations when planning an operation.

a. Begin Planning - Step 1. This step is initiated with the receipt of a mission. The mission may be received as a warning order or operation order. The commander's estimate is started by an analysis of the mission. Then the use of available time is planned. Warning orders are issued to subordinates, available information is collected, and a map reconnaissance is made. Planning guidance is formulated.

b. Arrange - Step 2. Arrangements are made for reconnaissance, movement of the unit, coordination with adjacent and supporting units, and issuance of the order. The commander meets with the staff to exchange information, provide preliminary planning guidance, and issue instructions relative to reconnaissance missions.

c. Continue Planning - Step 3. Courses of action are investigated during the conduct of the reconnaissance and reports from the staff are received regarding their reconnaissance missions. Firm planning guidance is issued to the staff and upon completion of estimates, the recommendation is received. The commander, considering the staff recommendation, completes his estimate and announces his decision and concept.

d. Complete Plan - Step 4. The detailed tactical and CSS plans are completed under the supervision of the commander, formalized into operations or administrative plans or orders, coordinated with various headquarters, and submitted to the commander for approval. When approved by the commander, the completed plan becomes the order.
e. **Issue Order - Step 5.** The order is issued orally to subordinate commands; however, time permitting, it may be issued in written form. Its complete understanding must be ensured.

f. **Supervise - Step 6.** After the order is issued, the commander, assisted by his staff, supervises its execution to ensure that the intent of the order is carried out. Higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters are informed of developments, and plans are modified as necessary to ensure accomplishment of the mission.

2403. **PHASES OF ATTACK**

Generally, the attack is planned and executed in three phases: preparatory, conduct, and consolidation and reorganization.

a. **Preparatory Phase.** During this phase, preliminary operations are executed which tactically dispose the force to conduct the attack. These include:

1. Movement to, and concentration of forces in, the forward area prior to the attack (to assembly areas; movement to attack positions started).

2. Final preparation of attack echelon (reorganization, resupply, rest, reconnaissance, plans and orders, training, orientation, coordination, maps, security, rehearsals, etc.).

3. Development of the enemy position and intensification of intelligence operations.

4. Execution of the deception plan, including feints and demonstrations.

5. Fires before the attack may be completed and preparation fire initiated as scheduled (to include chemical and nuclear fires and assessment of damage created).

6. Completion of preparations for relief in place or passage of lines is required.

b. **Conduct Phase.** The conduct of the attack involves three separate stages in which a force is advanced in a decisive direction and closes with the enemy to capture or destroy him.

1. Assembly area to line of departure.

2. Line of departure to intermediate objectives.

3. Movement from the intermediate objectives to the final objective.

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c. Consolidation and Reorganization Phase. The purpose of the consolidation and reorganization is to prepare the attacking force for future action. When possible, the seizure of the objective should be followed by immediate continuation of the attack or exploitation of success obtained.

(1) Consolidation. Consolidation pertains to all measures taken to organize and strengthen a newly captured position, as it may be used against the enemy. Initially, a hasty defensive posture is assumed to ward off possible counterattacks. Thereafter, the unit takes necessary action to occupy the objective or, following minimum essential reorganization, to continue the attack, depending on its mission. Emphasis is placed on security, displacing and positioning of forces, fire planning, reconnaissance, and reorganization, but these actions should not unnecessarily slow the momentum of the attack if it is to be continued. Reconnaissance elements and motorized or air-mobile forces maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain information. Fires beyond the objective protect the reorganization and break up counterattacks.

(2) Reorganization. Reorganization includes all measures taken to restore order in a unit after combat and to maintain its combat effectiveness in order to prepare the force for further attack or pursuit of the enemy. Reorganization is continuous but is given special emphasis upon seizure of the objective. It includes reporting of unit location and status to higher headquarters, redistribution of personnel, evacuation, resupply, and restoration of control and communications. This phase presupposes that the attack has been successful. In the event it is not, the commander, at this time, takes alternate action depending upon whether his forces have simply failed to achieve their objective or have been repulsed—contingencies for which he should have previously planned.

2404. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

a. The scheme of maneuver is the plan for the placement and movement of organic and attached maneuver units to accomplish the mission. Factors which influence the commander in determining a scheme of maneuver are as follows:

(1) Mission. The mission assigns tasks to the commander which must be translated into missions for his units. His mission is the overriding consideration when he plans the attack.

(2) Enemy. All available information of the enemy's strength, location, morale, and composition is considered during attack planning. His dispositions and his nuclear and air capabilities will affect the commander's selection of maneuver routes, formations, organization for combat, plan of fire support, and security measures.

(3) Terrain and Weather. The effects of these vital factors upon the plan must be considered.
(4) Troops Available. This refers to all combat power available to the commander, to include maneuver elements, fire support, logistic support, and other supporting units. Time and space factors are important here.

b. In determining his scheme of maneuver, the commander, with the assistance of his staff, must make many determinations. Some of these—selection of objectives, distribution of forces, and tactical control measures—have already been discussed. Others are:

(1) Formation. In the process of selecting objectives, the battalion commander considers the formations which he plans to employ to attack and seize them. He gives primary consideration in this selection to the mission to be accomplished. Other considerations include:

(a) Enemy dispositions and capabilities (including degree of nuclear threat).
(b) Weather and terrain.
(c) Size of his assigned zone or TAOR.
(d) Combat effectiveness of subordinate units.
(e) Amount and type of fire support available.
(f) Teams of mobility.
(g) Location and mission of other friendly units.
(h) Security requirements.
(i) Ease of control.
(j) Need for speed of movement.

1. One Company in the Attack. A single company may make the attack when it is determined that friendly supporting fires will leave little or no effective enemy resistance in the objective area. It may also be used when the situation is vague or where very little resistance is expected. It may be used in a movement to make contact.

2. Two Companies in the Attack. If supporting fires are limited, it may be preferable to use two companies in the assault to increase the flexibility of the battalion by using a strong assaulting force, while still retaining a reserve.
Three Companies in the Attack. When adequate fire support is available and the battalion zone of action is wide, the situation may favor the use of three companies to clear the initial objective area rapidly. This formation facilitates clearance of the zone of action and is frequently employed in a limited objective attack. It permits the bulk of the battalion to close with the enemy in the shortest possible time. When three companies are committed, the battalion commander plans immediately to reconstitute a reserve as early as practicable. An attached tank unit, if not committed, is ideal as the reserve or a platoon from one of the committed companies may be designated as the battalion reserve.

Other Formations. The battalion commander may adopt other formations which facilitate the accomplishment of his mission and are best suited for the particular situation with which he is faced. Most battalion missions require more than one company in the assault. The distance by which companies are separated is influenced by the battalion mission, the means of mobility available, the terrain, the enemy situation, available fire support, and the ability of the battalion commander to maintain control of the attack. Effective communications have considerable influence as to the degree of distance that can be maintained between companies.

(2) Organization for Combat

(a) The commander must organize the elements of his command, including attached units, so they can accomplish their mission. Organization for combat is the process by which forces are organized or tailored to meet the tactical requirements of the battlefield. Such organization accomplishes two specific purposes:

1. Combines adequate forces to accomplish each element of the assigned mission.

2. Facilitates command and control.

(b) The infantry battalion's organic weapons are generally employed in support of the entire battalion; that is, 81mm mortars employed in a platoon firing position; Dragons employed by sections whenever possible. However, when organizing for combat, the commander may find it necessary or desirable to attach units or elements in direct support of other units; i.e., attachment of multiple Dragons sections and 81mm mortar sections to rifle companies.

(c) There is no preferred way to task organize any unit. The decision as to which measure will provide the desired control is based on unit capabilities to control and administer other units and on the requirements of a particular mission. Continued operations as an independent battalion may reveal a preferred method for that type of operation. However, a change in mission, making a battalion an interior unit in conventional operations, may necessitate a change in task organization.
(3) **Reorganization.** No plan of attack is complete unless it considers holding those objectives seized. Reorganization and consolidation must be considered at the time the plan of maneuver and plan of supporting fires are being developed. Reorganization must be a continuous process. In essence, it is that readjustment and reequipment necessary to maintain the combat effectiveness of a unit during action. By keeping abreast of the situation, the commander can ensure that reorganization is taking place without stopping or slowing the operation.

(4) **Consolidation.** Consolidation is the tactical arrangement of troops and weapons necessary to hold a final objective after it has been seized. Unless the unit is to continue the attack, the commander consolidates the objective in accordance with his prior plans. He augments these plans with more detailed orders based on knowledge of the situation that he has been able to gain after seizure of the objective. He ensures that security has been established, that the necessary reconnaissance and surveillance is directed, and that defensive plans are adequate. Provisions for consolidation of the final objectives are an integral part of every plan. The commander includes his general plan for consolidation in his attack order. These provisions may include the designation of sectors for defense; provision for forward movement of reserves; tentative allocation of supporting fires; and tentative location for supply, evacuation, and command installations. The amount of detail going into this plan depends on whether or not the unit is to defend or to continue the attack after the objective has been seized.

2405. **PLAN OF SUPPORTING FIRES**

a. The infantry battalion commander is responsible for the coordination of supporting fires within his zone of action and for coordinating them with the operations of his unit. He ensures that all available fires are used to best assist in the accomplishment of the mission. The S-3 exercises staff supervision over coordination of the supporting fires with the plan of maneuver and the integration of the plan for supporting fires into the plan of defense. He assists his commander in establishing policies and priorities on which fire support plans are based. Fundamentally, the purpose of supporting fires is to neutralize enemy fires and observation so that friendly forces can maneuver. A good fire plan makes life a lot easier—and probably longer—for our assault troops, but it cannot do the whole job for them.

b. A plan of fire support will provide for fire in preparation for the attack, fire during or in support of the attack, and fire during reorganization or consolidation. Preparation fires are normally closely regulated as to target, time, quantity, and means of delivery. During the attack, the bulk of the fires will normally be those requested by the forward observers or controllers with the assault elements; this is where the commander's allocation of priority comes into play. He can deliver a tremendous volume of fire on a single target, or spread the means out over a wide battlefield. Fires during reorganization or consolidation are scheduled on known or suspected targets and will normally enable a sufficient volume of unscheduled fire means to fire on additional targets as they become known to the elements in contact.
2406. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

Once an attack is launched, flexibility and speed are paramount. The commander carries out his plan vigorously and exploits all opportunities. However, an attack seldom goes exactly as planned and the successful commander does not adhere blindly to his plan. How can the commander influence the action once the attack has commenced?

a. Personal Leadership. Once the attack begins, the commander moves to where he can best control his forces. The command post continues to be the nerve center, but today's communication and transportation capabilities permit the commander greater mobility. He may thus make his presence felt at the decisive point where it may influence the action. The dispersion on today's battlefield dictates that we no longer rest on crowd psychology but that we place greater reliance on the attitude of the individual Marine. The sight of his commander at the critical point may do much to improve this individual Marine's attitude. The commander must not become enmeshed in local action to the point where he becomes oblivious to the overall mission, for in so doing he infringes upon the initiative of his subordinates and loses contact with the battle as a whole.

b. Maneuver of Fires. Firepower is the commander's most readily available reserve. Because of the speed with which its volume can be varied, firepower can more quickly be employed to influence an operation than a reserve of troops.

c. Maneuver of Troop Units. The commander can have a decisive influence on the attack by maneuvering subordinate elements of his command, particularly the reserve. Reserve units must be dispersed and available for immediate employment; this demands a high degree of mobility. It may be that dispersed locations permit earlier employment of the reserve than does a single location. The commander commits that portion of the reserve required to accomplish a specific task. When, in his judgment, the situation warrants employment of the entire reserve, he commits it without hesitation. The next higher commander is always notified when any portion of the reserve is committed. The reserve must be committed at the right place, in the proper manner, at the decisive time. The premature commitment of the reserve, or withholding it too long, may jeopardize the mission. The commander must never lose sight of his mission and must employ his reserve to maintain or restore the momentum of the attack, to replace units that have been stopped, slowed, or partially destroyed, to exploit success of the attack, or to gain an advantage over the enemy. Once committed, a new reserve is constituted as quickly as possible. The reserve is used to exploit success rather than to redeem failure. (See figure 17.)
Figure 17. Employment of Reserve.
Section V. SUMMARY

2501. SUMMARY

Each offensive operation contains, to some degree, a movement to contact; an attack; an exploitation; and a pursuit. Commanders must ensure that their organization provides all-round security, ease of control, and the capability of reacting quickly to any situation. During the attack, forces are distributed into the main attack forces, the supporting attack forces, and the reserve. The main attack is directed toward the seizure of the mission objective; the supporting attack deceives and holds the enemy in place. The commander controls and coordinates offensive operations by the use of tactical control measures. By combining control measures, tasks, and the distribution of forces, the commander arrives at a scheme of maneuver. This, together with the plan of fire support, constitutes the plan of attack. Planning may be accomplished in a matter of minutes, hours, or weeks; however, your chances of success are much greater with sound planning than without.
CHAPTER 2 EXERCISE 2: Circle the best answer to questions 1 through 7. Check your answers with the solutions located at the end of the text.

1. All of the following statements are true about the commander’s troop-leading procedure except that it
   a. ensures concurrent planning by subordinates.
   b. consists of a scheme of maneuver and plan of fire support.
   c. ensures best use of time, equipment, and personnel.
   d. may be modified to fit different situations.

2. When using the troop-leading procedures, the commander issues his initial planning guidance during step
   a. 1, after he has analyzed his mission.
   b. 1, after he has issued his warning order.
   c. 2, after he has made arrangements for necessary actions preparatory to planning and coordinating the attack.
   d. 3, after he has conducted his reconnaissance and has received reconnaissance reports of other members of his unit.

3. In normal ground combat, a battalion commander’s plan of attack is comprised of a fire support plan and a/an
   a. scheme of maneuver.
   b. attack formation.
   c. consolidation plan.
   d. reorganization plan.

4. The use of three companies in the attack in a battalion operation is infrequent because
   a. adequate fire support cannot be provided.
   b. only limited objective attacks require four companies.
   c. normally, the infantry battalion only operates with three companies.
   d. it deprives the commander of flexibility.

5. The last covered position occupied by a unit prior to crossing the line of departure for a daylight attack is the
   a. phase line.
   b. attack position.
   c. contact line.
   d. assembly area.

6. Factors which influence the commander’s scheme of maneuver are his mission, the enemy, terrain and weather, and
   a. troops available.
   b. selection of objectives.
   c. distribution of forces.
   d. control measures.

7. A plan of fire support will provide for fire during which of the following situations?
   I. Preparation for the attack.
   II. Support of the attack.
   III. Reorganization or consolidation.
   a. None.
   b. All.
   c. I and II.
   d. II and III.